Authors: Christoph Munasinghe, Yuvraj Singh, Sakshi Rajpurohit, Shivangi Gupta, Riya Bothra

Abstract

This paper examines how the recent US-Iran conflict af ects regional stability and crisis escalation dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. Rather than treating the conflict as a direct cause of escalation in East Asia, the study uses it as a contextual stress test for US credibility, restraint, and escalation management under conditions of strategic rivalry. Drawing on deterrence theory and security dilemma logic, the paper argues that external crises can shape Taiwan Strait stability by altering Chinese perceptions of American resolve, military overextension, and willingness to absorb escalation costs. The central mechanism is therefore perceptual and signaling-based: US military action against Iran may be interpreted by Beijing either as evidence of credible deterrent capacity or as a sign of strategic distraction and vulnerability. Through a process-tracing approach focused on of icial statements, crisis episodes, military activity, and grey-zone coercion, the paper analyzes whether the US-Iran conflict increased the likelihood, speed, or intensity of US-China crisis interactions. It finds that escalation spillover is more likely to occur through calibrated pressure, alliance signaling, and arms-racing dynamics than through immediate military confrontation. The paper contributes to security studies by linking external crisis behavior to deterrence stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Keywords: Deterrence – Signaling – External Crisis – Avoidable Confrontation – Security – Opportunism – Stability