Under SDG 16 Integrating JS Mill's Framework - for Enhancing Institutional Accountability and Inclusive Decision-Making

Under SDG 16 Integrating JS Mill’s Framework – for Enhancing Institutional Accountability and Inclusive Decision-Making

Gogoi Ryka, BA Political Science, The Assam Royal Global University

Chaurasia Mayank, BA(H) Political Science, Atma Ram Sanatan Dharma College, University of Delhi

ABSTRACT

This paper shows how John Stuart Mill’s political theory can help to strengthen institutional accountability and inclusive decision‑making under Sustainable Development Goal 16. It argues that accountability should be understood as a combination of public answerability, justification and responsiveness, not merely as monitoring or compliance. Mill’s writings on liberty, utility and representative government connect institutional credibility with civic development through public reasoning and meaningful participation.

Existing SDG 16 indicators often rely on measures such as corruption levels, electoral turnout or judicial independence. While useful, they do not fully capture whether institutions genuinely listen to citizens and change their decisions in response to public needs. Mill’s framework provides a normative basis for evaluating institutions in terms of both performance and democratic quality.

The study combines normative textual analysis of Mill’s major works with document‑based institutional analysis. It translates Mill’s principles into measurable institutional indicators and applies them to a concrete case, for example: the social audit mechanism under India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). The case demonstrates the feasibility of a Millian framework for evaluating accountability and inclusion. The paper concludes that Mill’s ideas remain relevant for contemporary governance because they help connect accountability with legitimacy and inclusion with civic development.

INTRODUCTION

Public institutions in many democracies face declining trust, weak answerability and limited citizen influence over decisions that affect their lives. In India, for example, the Right to Information Act has opened up government data, yet citizens often find that exposing corruption or irregularities does not lead to timely corrective action. This gap between formal transparency and genuine accountability raises a fundamental question: how should institutional accountability and inclusion be evaluated so that they capture both the procedures and the substantive & democractic quality of governance?

This paper addresses that question using the political theory of John Stuart Mill. Mill’s work is useful because it does not treat accountability as a technical checklist. Instead, it links accountability to public justification, participation to civic development, and representative government to sustained responsiveness. When embedded in the global framework of SDG 16 which calls for effective, accountable and inclusive institutions; Mill’s ideas can provide the normative grounding that current indicators often lack.

Defining core concepts:

Accountability: Following Bovens (2007), accountability is defined as the obligation of public institutions to explain and justify their actions to citizens and oversight bodies, and to take responsibility for the consequences. It involves not just reporting data but answering questions and being open to correction.
Utility: Mill’s understanding of utility goes far beyond aggregating immediate satisfaction. He distinguishes higher pleasures (intellectual, moral and civic) from lower ones (Mill, 1863/2001). In institutional terms, utility means promoting the long‑term capacities that allow citizens to reason, participate and hold power to account – what can be summarised as “civic development.”
Participation: Participation is not mere consultation or the presence of citizens at meetings. Mill treats it as a practice that develops judgement and responsibility. Meaningful participation gives citizens an influence on outcomes and requires institutions to listen and adjust (Mill, 1861/1991).

This paper measures inclusion not by how many meetings are held but by whether the voices of the least powerful make a difference.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Convert Mill’s utilitarian principles into measurable institutional indicators for accountability under SDG 16.
Show how Mill’s ideas on participation and representative government can guide inclusive decision‑making.
Test the practical feasibility of the framework through a case study of Indian local governance.
Build a clear conceptual link between Mill’s political theory and specific SDG 16 targets.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND GAPS

Accountability frameworks

The scholarly literature distinguishes political, administrative, legal and social accountability (Bovens, 2007). In many governance reforms, especially under New Public Management, accountability has been reduced to performance measurement, audits and compliance reporting. While these tools are necessary, they often miss the relational dimension – whether an institution actually answers the public. Even the newer “New Public Governance” approach, which emphasises networks and stakeholder collaboration, tends to focus on institutional design rather than the normative purpose of accountability (Osborne, 2010). A critical reading reveals that most frameworks tell us “how” accountability works but not “why” it matters for democratic life.

Participation literature

Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation remains a powerful lens: it exposes the difference between tokenism and genuine citizen power. Cornwall (2008) and Gaventa (2004) later stressed that good participation can strengthen legitimacy and responsiveness. However, empirical studies consistently find that without deliberate effort, participation becomes symbolic – elites retain control while the marginalised are merely informed or placated (Mansuri & Rao, 2013). The literature thus points strongly to the quality of participation, but often remains procedural. It describes mechanisms without a clear normative thread connecting participation to democratic maturation.

SDG 16 and global governance

SDG 16 aims to build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions (United Nations, 2015). Its indicators, however, are dominated by surface level measures: corruption perception indices, voter turnout, homicide rates, etc. (Bexell & Jönsson, 2019; Fukuda‑Parr & McNeill, 2019). These do not tell us whether an institution publicly justifies its decisions, responds to citizen grievances in a timely way, or ensures that marginalised groups actually influence policymaking. In a gist, SDG 16 lacks a strong philosophical foundation that can connect statistical indicators with the deeper purposes of democratic governance.

RESEARCH GAP

Taken together, the literatures are rich on procedures but lack normative content. Accountability studies are strong on mechanisms but weak on the public moral relationship that should underpin them. Participation studies prize inclusion but rarely explain why inclusion should deepen democratic legitimacy beyond procedural fairness. SDG 16 provides a global platform but without a clear theory that ties targets to civic development.

Mill’s political theory fills that gap. It links accountability to public justification, participation to the development of civic judgement, and utility to long‑term democratic outcomes rather than short‑term satisfaction. His framework therefore offers a way to evaluate institutions not just by what they “do” but by what they “cultivate” among citizens.

METHODOLOGY

This study uses a mixed‑method design that combines normative textual analysis with document‑based institutional analysis and a single‑case application.

Normative textual analysis: A close reading of Mill’s On Liberty, Utilitarianism and Considerations on Representative Government extracts core principles on liberty, utility, participation and accountability.
Document‑based institutional analysis: The study reviews SDG 16 targets and indicators, Indian governance laws (e.g., MGNREGA, Right to Information Act) and evaluation reports from the Comptroller and Auditor General, civil society organisations (such as MKSS in Rajasthan) and academic field studies.
Translation into indicators: From the normative criteria, a set of measurable institutional indicators is developed. These are designed to be usable in field assessments – indicators that can be observed, counted or coded from records and hearings.
Case application: The framework is tested against the real‑world example of social audits in MGNREGA. The case does not attempt to statistically prove causality; rather, it demonstrates that the Millian indicators are substantive and can reveal meaningful differences in institutional quality.

MILL’S PRINCIPLES AND THEIR FORMULATION INTO INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS

Mill’s political thought rests on three pillars that directly inform institutional analysis.

Liberty and public scrutiny

Mill’s harm principle limits state power to actions that prevent harm to others (Mill, 1859/1978). More broadly, he argues that no authority can claim infallibility, so open criticism and public inquiry must be protected.

Institutional translation: Institutions should not restrict information or exclude criticism.
Measurable indicators:

Legal protections for freedom of expression and the right to information.
Number of information requests answered within the statutory period.

Existence of protection mechanisms for whistle‑blowers and complainants from reprisal.

Frequency with which audit reports or institutional reviews are discussed in public forums.

Utility as civic development

Mill distinguishes higher pleasures (cultivating reason, autonomy and moral sense) from lower ones. Utility, for him, is not the greatest immediate happiness but the greatest development of human capacities over time (Brink, 2013).

Institutional translation: Institutions should be assessed by whether they build trust, fair procedures and opportunities for citizens to exercise civic agency – not simply by short‑term efficiency.
Measurable indicators:

Public trust scores (for example: from citizen surveys).
Reduction in arbitrary or unreasoned administrative decisions over time.

Evidence that policy or programme changes occur after citizen feedback (learning loops).

Fairness of procedures, measured by user satisfaction with the complaint‑handling process.

Representative government and responsiveness

Mill argued that representation is not a one‑time delegation of power but an ongoing relationship of justification and moral responsiveness (Mill, 1861/1991; Thompson, 1976). Representatives must listen, explain and be willing to revise decisions.

Institutional translation: Accountability bodies should be judged by how promptly and thoroughly they respond to public inputs, and by whether the most marginalised groups can access them.
Measurable indicators:

Response rate to citizen complaints within a defined period.
Proportion of audit objections that result in concrete administrative or financial corrective actions.

Diversity of participants at public hearings (gender, caste, income).

Evidence that the views of underrepresented groups are reflected in final decisions – for example, through documented changes in work selection or budget allocation after public hearings.

Together, these indicators make Mill’s abstract principles operational. They move beyond “corruption perception” to assess actual institutional conduct.

CASE APPLICATION: MGNREGA SOCIAL AUDITS IN INDIA

To demonstrate feasibility, the framework is applied to the social audit process under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). Social audits are statutory public hearings where villagers (particularly workers) examine official records, cross‑check works undertaken and question officials about expenditure and irregularities.

Background and current accountability deficits

India’s MGNREGA is one of the largest rights‑based employment programmes in the world. Section 17 of the Act mandates regular social audits “to ensure transparency and accountability.” In Rajasthan, the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) pioneered these audits, which have since been institutionalised in several states. Yet field studies show that the quality of audits varies enormously. Often, attendance is thin, women and Dalit workers remain silent, officials do not provide clear answers, and audit findings do not translate into recovery of misused funds or departmental action (Dreze & Khera, 2017; Aiyar & Mehta, 2015).

Applying Millian indicators

Public justification (accountability)

Indicator: Percentage of audit objections for which officials provide a reasoned written reply within 30 days.

Observation: In Rajasthan, in well‑conducted audits involving MKSS facilitation, officials are compelled to offer explanations in public; many discrepancies are acknowledged on the spot. In states where audits are a formality, queries remain unanswered and workers are left with mere assurances.

Responsiveness

Indicator: Proportion of recorded audit objections resulting in financial recovery or disciplinary action within six months.

Observation: In Rajasthan’s early audits, recovery rates from guilty officials were significantly higher than the national average (Shankar et al., 2011). By contrast, in many districts of Uttar Pradesh or Bihar, audit reports pile up without meaningful follow‑up.

Inclusion quality (participation)

Indicator: Share of audit attendees from Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe and women who actively speak, and number of issues raised by them that are incorporated into the final audit action report.

Observation: Even where women and SC/ST workers attend, their participation is often passive. Facilitators report that only about 10‑15% of women speak in many locations. When active facilitation and separate women’s meetings are conducted, not only does participation rise, but the complaints raised lead to specific changes. For example: altering the choice of works to be closer to the habitation (Pankaj & Tankha, 2010).

Liberty and protection

Indicator: Availability of a functional complaint mechanism free from intimidation; number of reported cases of retaliation per 100 audits.

Observation: In areas where audits are routine and backed by civil society presence, workers are more willing to testify openly. In contrast, where local elites dominate, fear persists and the audit becomes a ritual. The absence of a strong whistle‑blower protection law remains a critical weakness (Transparency International India, 2022).

What the case reveals

The social audit mechanism contains the institutional framework for a Millian form of accountability that inculcates public justification, allows direct questioning and creates a record of objections. But its effectiveness depends on measurable factors: response rates, diversity of participation, use of findings for corrective action and a safe environment. Where these indicators are strong, the audit acts as a genuine accountability exercise. Where they are weak, it becomes a symbolic gesture. This shows that a Millian framework does not remain stuck in theory; it generates a design that can distinguish between substantive and performative accountability.

LINKING THE MILLIAN FRAMEWORK TO SDG 16 AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Mapping to SDG 16 targets

The indicators derived from Mill align closely with several SDG 16 targets.

Target 16.6: “Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions” → indicators on public justification, response rates and implementation of audit recommendations.

Target 16.7: “Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision‑making” → diversity and influence of marginalised groups in hearings, documented changes in policy after citizen input.

Target 16.10: “Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms” → freedom of expression protections, response rate to information requests, absence of reprisals.

By linking these targets to theoretically grounded indicators, SDG 16 assessments can move beyond generic country ratings and begin to measure the civic relational quality of institutions.

Policy recommendations for Indian local governance

Drawing from the case, the following steps are proposed:

Strengthen the feedback loop: Mandate that every public hearing record must be accompanied by an “action‑taken report” published online within 60 days, listing each objection, the official’s response and the financial or administrative follow‑up.
Enhance inclusion actively: Conduct separate pre‑audit meetings with women and marginalised caste groups, facilitated by trained community workers, so that their issues are articulated and placed on the audit agenda.
Protect participants: Introduce a fast‑track mechanism at the district level to address complaints of intimidation or retaliation linked to social audits.
Build local civic skills: Treat social audits as spaces for civic learning. Simple training on reading muster rolls and understanding budgets (offered regularly) can increase the quality of deliberation and make participation more informed.
Link audit findings to formal accountability systems: When audits reveal major financial irregularities, automate the forwarding of reports to the relevant disciplinary and anti‑corruption authorities, with mandatory timelines for response.

These suggestions are directly derived from the Millian framework: they aim not merely to create more reports but to build the *conditions* under which accountability becomes a continuing relationship of justification, listening and correction.

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that John Stuart Mill’s political theory offers a robust normative compass for institutional accountability and inclusive decision‑making under SDG 16. Mill’s emphasis on public justification, the development of human capacities through participation, and responsiveness as the essence of representation provides a missing link between governance procedures and democratic quality.

The translation of his ideas into measurable indicators,i.e., public justification, complaint resolution, diversity of inclusion, protection of liberty which makes the framework usable. The case of MGNREGA social audits in India demonstrates the framework’s feasibility: it reveals that the same legal mechanism can produce vastly different accountability outcomes depending on the quality of responsiveness, inclusion and liberty that implementers foster.

Ultimately, the paper shows that institutions cannot build lasting trust through formal procedures alone. They must be willing to explain, to listen, and to change when public reasoning demands it. Mill’s theory, operationalised as a set of concrete indicators, can guide policymakers, civil society and international bodies in evaluating whether institutions are genuinely accountable and inclusive, i.e., in the very heart of SDG 16.

REFERENCES

–Aiyar, Y., & Mehta, S. K. (2015). Spectators or participants? Economic and Political Weekly, 50(7), 66–69.

– Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 35(4), 216–224.

– Bexell, M., & Jönsson, K. (2019). Responsibility and the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. Forum for Development Studies, 46(1), 13–29.

– Bovens, M. (2007). Analysing and assessing accountability. European Law Journal, 13(4), 447–468.

– Brink, D. O. (2013). Mill’s progressive principles. Oxford University Press.

– Cornwall, A. (2008). Unpacking “participation”. Community Development Journal, 43(3), 269–283.

– Dreze, J., & Khera, R. (2017). Social audits and MGNREGA delivery. In J. Dreze (Ed.), Sense and solidarity (pp. 202–223). Oxford University Press.

–Fukuda-Parr, S., & McNeill, D. (2019). Knowledge and politics in setting and measuring the SDGs. Global Policy, 10(S1), 5–15.

– Gaventa, J. (2004). Towards participatory governance. In S. Hickey & G. Mohan (Eds.), Participation: From tyranny to transformation? (pp. 25–41). Zed Books.

– Mansuri, G., & Rao, V. (2013). Localizing development: Does participation work? World Bank.

– Mill, J. S. (1859/1978). On liberty. Hackett.