Authors:  Hrishik Bains, Faalisha Misttry, Sneha Pal, Nandini Vengattaramanan, Guda Abhishek Goud, Ishita Salwan

Abstract

The US dollar maintains its position as the leading currency for reserves, trade invoicing, and
financial infrastructure operations, but discussion about de-dollarisation has returned into
focus. The opposing views between these two concepts create doubts about what modern dedollarisation programmes actually achieve and how they function in practice. The study
explores how states use de-dollarisation programmes to send strategic messages through the
international monetary system, which operates with American dollar dominance. The authors
demonstrate that de-dollarisation serves as a strategic communication tool — a costly,
observable action that projects resolve or intent without constituting a genuine exit from dollar
dependence — rather than a real exit plan. Nations maintain partial dollar reliance through
symbolic and conditional measures. The study employs a qualitative comparative approach to
examine cases which display different levels of sanctions impact and economic strength. The
research findings demonstrate that sanctions enforcement levels, together with political
systems and institutional strength, determine how strongly signals are sent and how trustworthy
they appear. The research findings show that these signals produce short-term effects which do
not lead to lasting changes in the system. The research warns government officials to avoid
overestimating how much de-dollarisation will transform the fundamental structure of their
economy.

Introduction

The US dollar retains structural dominance in global reserves, trade invoicing, and financial
infrastructure, yet de-dollarisation has re-emerged as a prominent feature of policy discourse
— particularly following the expanded use of financial sanctions and BRICS declarations of
monetary independence. This paper examines the gap between that rhetoric and material
monetary behaviour.
Drawing on signalling theory — which examines how actors convey credible information
under conditions of uncertainty (Spence, 1973; Connelly et al., 2011) — this paper argues that
de-dollarisation functions as a strategic communication tool: a costly, observable action that
projects resolve or intent without constituting a genuine exit from dollar dependence. The
established measures show that a country maintains monetary independence while it defies
coercive actions and pursues its strategic goals, although it remains dependent.
De-dollarisation signals are directed at three analytically distinct audiences, each with different
informational needs and response logics: (1) domestic constituencies, for whom such moves
signal economic sovereignty and resistance to foreign coercion; (2) rival great powers, particularly the United States, to whom they communicate resolve and rising exit costs; and (3)
non-Western peer states and Global South partners, to whom they project leadership and the
viability of monetary alternatives. Signal credibility and effectiveness vary across these
audiences depending on the observable costliness of the measure undertaken. They do not
result in structural changes; rather, the method describes how countries use public monetary
operations — which cost money — to handle political barriers within the current international
monetary framework.
The paper establishes its argument through a three-step development process. The research
establishes a theoretical framework which combines International Political Economy and
signalling theory to study how currencies function as strategic communication tools. This paper
asks: how do states employ de-dollarisation initiatives as strategic signals within a dollardominated international monetary system, and under what conditions — defined by sanctions
exposure, regime type, and institutional capacity — do such signals gain credibility? The
research applies a qualitative comparative method to study Russia, the BRICS collective, and
Peru, demonstrating how de-dollarisation works when countries face various political and
economic situations. The paper then investigates how these unfolding events will influence our
comprehension of monetary control and financial organisational structures.

Background

Evolution of the Dollar-Centric System

Post-WWI instabilities, like the gradual abandonment of the gold standard during the Great
Depression and the “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies described by Heywood (2011) as
“economically self-defeating and politically dangerous,” prompted a shift towards a
systematised global economy. In August 1944, the UN Monetary and Financial Conference at
Bretton Woods institutionalised “embedded liberalism” for the post-World War II international
financial and monetary system through the Bretton Woods institutions: the IMF, the IBRD
(World Bank), and the GATT (the World Trade Organization). This framework balanced
domestic stability with global trade through fixed exchange rates.
The US strategically promoted economic reconstruction of war-ravaged Europe to contain
communism by positioning the US dollar as the currency anchor. The suspension of the dollar’s
convertibility to gold under President Nixon ended the Bretton Woods system. This dollarbased fiat system solidified US hegemony, enabling Washington to instrumentalise its
economic and military assistance to shape its globalist foreign policy (Kegley & Wittkopf,
1995).

Conceptualising De-Dollarisation

De-dollarisation refers to strategic multilateral efforts to de-emphasise dollar-based hegemony,
widen opportunities, and diversify the international financial system by encouraging trade in
national currencies. Monetary instability, the fiscal burden of reserve accumulation, and
foreign currency sovereign debt trigger developing states to frame precautionary policies. The
growing anti-dollar orientation among EU nations, strategic rivalries mounted by China, and
Russia’s intensifying perceived national security threat all intensify de-dollarisation pressures
among these states. These include monetary autonomy tools, payment settlement and price
benchmarking strategies, among others.
Despite these strategic manoeuvres, the targeted multi-polarisation of the status quo remains
far from reached, given current geopolitical volatility. Beijing’s policies reveal its hegemonic
ambitions rather than efforts to restructure the aforementioned framework. While inter-BRICS
rivalries diminish its recognised potential, the Trump 2.0 era reveals and reinforces the
resilience of dollar dominance in global trade, despite worldwide political criticism.

Strategic Signalling in IR

Public declarations of BRICS monetary alternatives and local-currency trade function
primarily as narrative positioning — signalling opposition to US-led financial hierarchies
without constituting a credible structural exit. Joint communiqués by countries, despite
carrying sufficient diplomatic relevance, remain as costless signals or aspirations without any
concrete infrastructural basis. Conversely, since de-dollarisation is closely tied to the economic
sovereignty of Russia and China, and is considered crucial for India’s strategic autonomy, there
are appreciable instances of costly signals: consistent reduction of Indian and Chinese holdings
of US Treasury bonds (August–November 2025), building the Cross-Border Interbank
Payment System (CIPS) and the New Development Bank (NDB), and inclusion of the yuan in
the list of investable currencies for the National Welfare Fund of Russia.
Thus, the sunk costs and tied hands involved, to a certain degree, credibly signal the US of a
gradual transformation towards a multipolarised global economy, without which dedollarisation stays a mere rhetorical tool, or a soft signal.

Empirical Anchors: The Gap Between Signalling and Structural Change

Empirical indicators support the characterisation of de-dollarisation as primarily symbolic. The
dollar’s share of global foreign exchange reserves declined from approximately 71% in 2000
to around 58% in 2024 (IMF COFER, 2024), yet no alternative currency has absorbed that
share — the decline reflects diversification across multiple currencies, not a pivot to a single
rival. The dollar remains present in 88% of all foreign exchange transactions (BIS Triennial
Survey, 2022). Meanwhile, Russia’s ruble-settlement mandates for energy exports applied
selectively and generated currency mismatch costs without displacing dollar-denominated
pricing benchmarks in global commodity markets. These data points establish the gap between
signalling activity and structural monetary change that this paper theorises.

Literature Review

Dollar Hegemony and Monetary Power

IPE scholarship establishes dollar power as structurally embedded rather than merely coercive.
Strange’s (1988) concept of “structural power” — the ability to shape the rules within which
others operate — captures how dollar dominance conditions access to credit, trade, and security
without direct coercion. Cohen (2015) extends this through the concept of “currency power,”
distinguishing between states that define the monetary system’s architecture and those that
merely participate in it. Building on these foundations, Norrlof (2014) and Kuznetsov (2024)
demonstrate that the US sets the institutional plumbing of global finance, influencing others’
options without resort to explicit coercion.
The dollar is perceived in two main ways: coercive and permissive. Those who control dollar
clearing and correspondent banking can impose sanctions and financial blockades worldwide,
leveraging the dollar in foreign policy. The dollar also provides positive benefits like crisis
support and safe assets, encouraging countries to voluntarily choose and use it, even after
broadly criticising US dominance (Norrlof, 2014). This polarity explains why dollar power
persists and why its legitimacy is questioned yet still accepted (Norrlof, 2014; Kuznetsov,
2024). The dollar’s importance in global finance creates an “imperial circle” where its
movements shape the global economic condition, resulting in a strengthened financial position
of the US (Akinci et al., 2024).

De-Dollarisation Debates in IPE

Recent findings highlight a gradual, partial, and asymmetrical shift away from the dollar rather
than a rapid displacement, introducing the concept of a multipolar currency system as China
and other emerging powers alongside BRICS initiatives attempt to make a difference. Dollar
dominance has declined from approximately 70–73% of world reserves in 2000 to around 60%
today, with the euro and renminbi growing stronger (Todorova et al., 2024; (Burke, 2024). Dedollarisation is considered both a natural process of hegemonic transition and a response to
sanctions, tariffs, and weaponisation.
The US has strong money market laws that protect and reinforce the dollar’s role as a safe asset
and invoicing currency, making it harder for global competitors to match (Norrlof, 2014;
Todorova et al., 2024; Kuznetsov, 2024). Projections and econometric analyses find dedollarisation to be a slow, uncertain, and limited process, primarily with respect to changing
payment methods and reserve structures (Omarova et al., 2025; Todorova et al., 2024; Nikolić
et al., 2024). Alternatives like the euro and renminbi lack the liquidity, convertibility, and
institutional credibility needed to shift the dollar rather than merely complement it (Todorova
et al., 2024; Burke, 2024).

Strategic Signalling and Economic Statecraft

The US uses sanctions and financial rules as a form of global statecraft — prohibiting countries
from using the dollar if they do not adhere to its preferences, as seen in cases with Iran and
Russia (Chuvakhina, 2025; Azevedo, 2024; Burke, 2024). Countries in the BRICS association
have responded by using currency swaps, alternative payment methods, and trade rerouting to
reduce dollar dependence and encourage monetary autonomy (Todorova et al., 2024; Burke,
2024).
The literature highlights the limitations of economic signalling. Excessive sanctions and
monetary pressure can dissolve trust in US leadership, prompting countries to use other
currencies even while the dollar remains broadly trusted (Chuvakhina, 2025; Azevedo, 2024).
Switching systems carries significant transition costs; countries therefore adopt middle grounds
— updating payment methods or changing regulatory frameworks — rather than wholesale
dollar exit. This is described in the literature as modifying the monetary plumbing (Todorova
et al., 2024; Akinci et al., 2024). Exploiting coercive tools risks long-term fragmentation; the
US would exercise lesser control even if the dollar prevails (Azevedo, 2024; Tan, 2025).

Theoretical Framework

International Political Economy (IPE) is a field that examines the complex interplay between
economics and politics on a global scale. It accounts for currency behaviour and emphasises
efficiency, liquidity, and network effects in explaining the persistence of dollar dominance.
From this viewpoint, reliance on US dollars reflects a rational adaptation to its deep financial
markets, trade invoicing role, and institutional credibility. Nonetheless, such explanations fail
to account for why states adopt de-dollarisation initiatives that impose clear economic and
institutional costs, especially in the absence of a fully viable monetary alternative.
De-dollarisation initiatives are costly due to liquidity losses, transition frictions, and
reputational risks, distinguishing them from rhetorical opposition to dollar dominance. Their
credibility is reinforced through audience costs. These costs are magnified in contexts of
geopolitical competition and financial sanctions, where monetary autonomy becomes closely
associated with sovereignty and resistance to coercion. De-dollarisation thus operates less as
an immediate exit from the dollar system and more as a well-calibrated signal of strategic intent
within a structurally asymmetric monetary order.
To bridge this gap, the study integrates IPE with signalling theory. Signalling theory focuses
on situations with information asymmetry between two actors (Drover et al., 2018; Spence,
1973), where one party — the sender — must decide which information to convey to the other
party — the receiver (Connelly et al., 2011). It highlights how actors communicate strategic
intent under conditions of uncertainty. In a dollar-dominated system, currency policy is
inherently visible to external and domestic audiences, including rival states, allies, and financial
markets. Measures such as reserve diversification, local-currency trade settlement, and the
construction of alternative payment systems are not merely technical adjustments but
politically salient actions that convey information about strategic orientation and vulnerability.
Currency behaviour therefore functions as a form of strategic communication.
The relationship between de-dollarisation initiatives and signalling outcomes is conditioned by
three intervening variables. First, exposure to financial sanctions heightens the perceived risks
of dollar dependence and increases the informational value of currency-based actions. Second,
regime type shapes the political cost tolerance associated with sustaining costly signals, as less
democratically constrained regimes face weaker domestic opposition to economic adjustment
costs. Third, economic and institutional capacity affects signal credibility by determining a
state’s ability to absorb liquidity constraints, manage transition frictions, and sustain reforms
over time. Together, these factors structure the causal pathway linking currency behaviour to
strategic signalling.

Methodology

This paper employs qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine de-dollarisation as
strategic signalling. The study period spans 2014–2025, bracketed by Russia’s initial postCrimea currency diversification and the most recent BRICS monetary declarations.
Cases are selected on three independently varying criteria: (1) sanctions exposure — high for
Russia, moderate-to-low for BRICS, and none for Peru; (2) regime type — authoritarian for
Russia, mixed across BRICS, and democratic for Peru; and (3) institutional and economic
capacity — constrained for Russia post-2022, heterogeneous across BRICS, and developing
for Peru. This most-different systems design allows the study to isolate which conditions —
alone or in combination — produce credible rather than merely rhetorical signalling.
Three cases are examined to represent variation across the signalling spectrum: Russia (highsanctions, authoritarian, reactive signaller); the BRICS collective (low-to-moderate sanctions,
mixed regimes, proactive signaller); and Peru (non-sanctioned, democratic, domestic dedollarisation context). Signal strength is operationalised through four observable indicators:
formal policy announcements, reserve composition shifts, payment infrastructure development
(e.g. CIPS, Mir), and trade invoicing changes.

Hypotheses

From the theoretical framework, four testable hypotheses are derived. H1 (Sanctions–Signal
Link) posits that states facing higher levels of financial sanctions are more likely to adopt
visible de-dollarisation initiatives as signals of resistance to monetary coercion. H2 (Capacity–
Credibility Link) argues that de-dollarisation signals are more credible and more likely to be
sustained when supported by greater economic and institutional capacity. H3 (Regime–Cost
Tolerance Link) suggests that less democratically constrained regimes are better able to
maintain costly de-dollarisation signals over time due to lower domestic political constraints.
H4 (Visibility–Effect Link) contends that more public, formalised, and institutionalised dedollarisation initiatives generate stronger signalling effects than informal or ad hoc measures.
Together, these hypotheses specify the conditions under which currency behaviour functions
as a credible strategic signal rather than a purely symbolic gesture.

Case Study: Russia

Russia’s engagement with de-dollarisation intensified in the aftermath of wide-ranging Western
sanctions imposed following the escalation of the Ukraine conflict. Restrictions on Russian
banks, financial institutions, and access to dollar-based payment channels disrupted established
energy trade practices and sharply narrowed Moscow’s economic room for manoeuvre. In this
context, Russia began re-orienting a portion of its energy exports toward non-Western markets
and exploring alternative settlement arrangements to reduce exposure to dollar-denominated
transactions. These shifts were driven first and foremost by economic adaptation under
coercive pressure, as maintaining export revenues became imperative for fiscal stability (IMF,
2023).
Alongside these adaptive adjustments, Russia also pursued measures that carried a clearer
signalling dimension. The introduction of ruble-based settlement requirements for certain
energy exports — particularly gas sales to select trading partners — was framed domestically
as an assertion of monetary sovereignty and externally as a challenge to the dominance of the
dollar in international energy markets. Russia simultaneously expanded the use of non-dollar
currencies in bilateral trade and sought to utilise alternative payment systems to bypass
established dollar-centric financial infrastructure. While these measures partially overlapped
with adaptive necessity, their public framing and symbolic presentation indicate a deliberate
effort to communicate political defiance beyond immediate economic adjustment (Cohen,
2015).
The distinction between adaptation and signalling is bounded by structural constraints. Russia’s
de-dollarisation initiatives remained limited by continued dependence on global commodity
markets, restricted currency convertibility, and structural barriers to scaling non-dollar trade.
These constraints circumscribed the material impact of ruble settlement and alternative
payment mechanisms, ensuring that changes were uneven and transaction-specific rather than
systemic. As a result, de-dollarisation functioned less as a pathway toward sustained monetary
independence and more as a reactive signalling strategy embedded within constrained
adaptation (Petry & Nölke, 2023). The Russian case thus illustrates how de-dollarisation can
operate as high-pressure, high-cost signalling under coercive conditions, altering selected trade
practices while leaving the underlying structure of dollar dominance largely intact (Strange,
1988)

Case Study: BRICS

This case treats BRICS not as a unitary monetary actor, but as a collective signalling platform
through which major emerging economies articulate shared concerns about the structural
imbalances of a dollar-dominated international monetary system. Although BRICS members
— Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — remain deeply integrated into dollar-based
trade, reserves, and global financial markets, unease has grown regarding the geopolitical
leverage such dependence enables. This concern has been amplified by the expanded use of
financial sanctions and increasing control over global payment infrastructures. BRICS provides
a multilateral forum through which such concerns can be voiced collectively, reducing the
political and economic risks associated with unilateral challenges to the existing system (Baylis
et al., 2020).
In practical terms, BRICS’ engagement with de-dollarisation has been gradual and selective
rather than transformative. Initiatives have centred on expanding the use of local currencies in
intra-BRICS trade, establishing bilateral currency swap arrangements, and strengthening
multilateral mechanisms such as the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve
Arrangement (Arnold, 2024). The emphasis on local currency lending reflects an attempt to
marginally reduce exposure to dollar-denominated finance while continuing to operate within
established market structures. These mechanisms are best understood as supplementing, rather
than substituting, dollar usage, and their implementation has remained uneven across member
states.
BRICS’ de-dollarisation agenda therefore functions primarily as low-cost, proactive strategic
signalling directed toward three distinct audiences: Western financial powers, to contest
monetary coercion; the Global South, to project leadership in the pursuit of a more multipolar
order; and domestic constituencies, to reinforce narratives of sovereignty and autonomy. China
is not treated as a standalone case here precisely because its currency strategy is embedded
within this broader collective signalling framework rather than representing a fully autonomous
monetary challenge (Cohen, 2015).
Despite this rhetoric, BRICS remains constrained by structural realities. Intra-BRICS trade
continues to be largely dollar-settled, institutional coordination is fragmented, and internal
asymmetries — most notably China’s financial predominance alongside India’s more cautious
monetary posture — limit deeper integration. The BRICS case thus illustrates how dedollarisation operates as symbolic resistance within a resilient dollar-dominated system,
reshaping discourse and expectations without constituting a credible pathway toward systemic
monetary transformation (Heywood, 2019).

Comparative Insights

Viewed together, the Russia and BRICS cases can be located along a signalling spectrum that
varies by pressure, cost, and intent. Russia represents a high-pressure, high-cost, and largely
reactive form of de-dollarisation signalling, shaped by sanctions and immediate economic
constraints. Its measures carried greater material risk but remained tightly bound by structural
dependence on global markets. BRICS, by contrast, reflects a low-pressure, low-cost, and more
proactive form of signalling, relying on collective rhetoric and incremental institutional
initiatives. While BRICS’ signalling lacks the urgency of Russia’s response, it benefits from
multilateral legitimacy and broader narrative reach, reinforcing de-dollarisation as a
communicative strategy rather than a transformative monetary exit. 

Discussion

Today, de-dollarisation appears more like a well-planned political performance than an
impending structural shift. States are signalling boldly while advancing cautiously. Particularly
after the dollar was weaponised through sanctions against Russia and other countries, many
governments have been observed using de-dollarisation as an indication of independence from
US authority (Quintana, 2025). Public declarations of BRICS monetary alternatives and localcurrency trade function primarily as narrative positioning — signalling opposition to US-led
financial hierarchies without constituting a credible structural exit, and persuading audiences
in the Global South and at home that governments are challenging US-led financial hierarchies.
Despite this framing, shifts to the yuan, euro, or gold are still limited and partial; the dollar
continues to dominate reserves, trade invoicing, and global financial infrastructure (Quintana,
2025). Since rival currencies have not addressed the fundamental issues of liquidity, legal
certainty, and network effects, de-dollarisation remains more aspirational than revolutionary.
However, emerging nations can today project a language of sovereignty and multipolarity, and
protect themselves against future sanctions, with even limited diversification (Canuto, 2025).
In this scenario, de-dollarisation has succeeded as a discursive strategy: it reframes the global
monetary order in the vocabulary of multipolarity and sovereignty, even as its material impact
on dollar usage remains limited.
Feasible de-dollarisation begins when signalling becomes costly for both states and domestic
financial standing. Successful cases show that signalling only turns substantive once
governments impose constraints that are difficult to revoke. In Peru’s financial de-dollarisation,
stricter prudential laws and steady inflation targeting made reversal politically and financially
costly, demonstrating policymakers’ commitment to economic sacrifice despite distress and
slower growth (Catão & Terrones, 2016).
The dollar persists not through economic size alone, but through the unparalleled influence of
networks that render alternatives unaffordable. Deep US Treasury markets, legal predictability,
and SWIFT dominance are examples of institutional embeddedness that produce selfreinforcing loops in which everyone uses dollars simply because everyone else does (Shin,
2023). The dollar is present in 88% of trades according to FX turnover data (BIS Triennial
Survey), and trade invoicing remains heavily denominated in dollars, far exceeding the euro
and the yuan (Wessel & Boocker, 2024). Structural limitations are evident: de-dollarisation
necessitates the simultaneous transformation of complete payment ecosystems, which is not
feasible without global cooperation. Challengers face preliminary obstacles, including shallow
markets, counterparty risk, and the absence of a lender of last resort. The dollar’s dependability
is a result of decades of linear architecture, rooted in its pervasive liquidity, deep capital
markets, and network effects (Thiagarajan et al., 2023; Shin, 2023).

Implications

Systemic and Global Implications

According to Eichengreen and Flandreau, reserve currency shifts in previous eras were long,
path-dependent processes characterised by crises and inertia rather than planned power
struggles. The dollar’s rise accelerated significantly after World War II, driven by network
effects and institutional consistency, whereas sterling’s hegemony steadily declined amid
Britain’s gradual retreat from global power — reflecting how historical reserve currency
transitions unfold over extended periods with significant structural forces at play. This evidence
weakens the concept of managed multipolarity, since major powers rarely relinquish their
monetary dominance cooperatively or through abrupt, orchestrated contests.
De-dollarisation, on the other hand, runs the risk of fragmentation due to competing blocs
(dollar vs. yuan or BRICS systems), high transaction costs, and liquidity silos — a pattern
reminiscent of the instability of the gold exchange standard in the 1920s, when multiple anchor
currencies exacerbated volatility in the absence of a single hegemonic stabiliser. In the absence
of a hegemonic stabiliser, true coordination remains unattainable (Eichengreen & Flandreau,
2009).

US Hegemony and Strategy

As targets adapt through trade rerouting, cryptocurrency channels, and third-party
intermediaries, US sanctions are becoming less effective against China and Russia
(Thiagarajan et al., n.d.). Farrell and Newman’s concept of weaponised interdependence shows
how America’s key network position enables chokepoint leverage — such as suspending dollar
clearance or SWIFT access — but also encourages countermeasures like China’s CIPS and dedollarisation agreements. However, adaptive dominance continues: US financial hegemony
regenerates through allied coercion, extraterritorial regulations, and layered restrictions,
transforming backlash into sophisticated coercion. Sanctions maintain dollar primacy even as
they progress from acute pain to systemic exclusion.

Emerging Power Strategies

In order to limit US dominance without abandoning the dollar system, emerging and middle
powers seek strategic autonomy through soft balancing. According to T.V. Paul’s (2018)
concept, these governments use institutions, informal alliances, and sanctions to prevent great
power overreach given the constraints of globalisation. Hard balancing through military
alliances is too costly given economic interdependence, supporting cautious tactics that protect
access to dollar networks while guarding against coercion. Countries like Brazil, India, and
others selectively challenge dollar hegemony through local currency trade and BRICS
cooperation while maintaining dollar reserves for stability (Paul, 2018). Autonomy flourishes
inside the unipolar financial order, not outside of it; without workable alternatives, exit remains
unlikely.

Conclusion

This paper argues that contemporary de-dollarisation efforts function less as genuine attempts
to dismantle dollar dominance and more as strategic signalling. Despite diversification rhetoric,
structural dependencies on the dollar persist, rendering de-dollarisation a costly form of
political communication directed at domestic audiences, Western powers, and Global South
partners. Comparative analysis shows that its effectiveness is conditioned by sanctions
exposure, regime type, and economic capacity. Russia illustrates reactive, high-cost signalling
under coercion, while BRICS reflects proactive, low-cost collective positioning.
Theoretically, the study reframes monetary behaviour as strategic communication within
asymmetric power structures, cautioning policymakers against overstating de-dollarisation’s
transformative potential without coordinated institutional and liquidity alternatives.

Future Research Directions

Future studies on de-dollarisation must give priority to militarised finance, regional blocs, and
digital currencies. Eswar Prasad describes how CBDCs facilitate programmable money and
cross-border efficiency, enabling BRICS countries to avoid SWIFT using interoperable
platforms such as India’s digital rupee pilots and China’s e-CNY (Prasad et al., 2021). In the
absence of international rules, these innovations risk accelerating de-dollarisation by dividing
liquidity into dollar-free zones. C. Randall Henning emphasises regional currency blocs —
such as AMU’s swap lines and ASEAN+3’s Chiang Mai Initiative — as resilient measures
against US sanctions that promote local currency settlement (Centre for International
Governance Innovation, 2020). Long-term research on weaponisation should monitor how
digital ledgers consolidate chokepoints as states diversify their reserves, while US supremacy
adjusts through stablecoin hegemony. Modelling hybrid threats, in which coding turns into
coercion, is necessary for multipolar finance.

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