Authors: SK Sanjana Chithambaram, KR Valliammai, Soumya Mittal, Shaana Faizal, Samanvi Mandapati, Manya Hegade S ABSTRACT This study examines whether India’s import tariff increases under the Make in India policy, launched in September 2014, achieved the stated objective of reducing dependence on foreign goods, particularly from China. Using product-level tariff and trade data from the World Bank’s WITS database for 2010–2023, we have analyzed and applied tariff rates, import volumes, and China’s share of India’s imports. Findings here indicate that tariffs rose sharply in the year 2018–2019, with the China-specific weighted average peaking at approximately 8.16% and the simple average reaching 12.2%, yet this had no discernible effect on aggregate import volumes, which continued to grow. China’s share of India’s imports similarly rose from 11.1% to 16.1%, directly contradicting the policy’s geopolitical rationale. A Pearson correlation test was made betweenChina-specific tariff rates and import volumes from China, yielding r = –0.12 (p ≈ 0.72), confirming no statistically significant relationship. The paper portrays a contrast between two sectors through comparative case analysis. The mobile phone/electronics sector, supported by the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) and the Phased Manufacturing Programme (PMP), saw measurable success. In contrast, the solar panel industry still relies on Chinese imports for over 80% of cell and module requirements despite the tariffs. These outcomes hence illustrate that tariff policy alone is insufficient without complementary industrial capacity-building through supply chain development, technology transfer, and firm-level capabilities. Keywords: Make in India, import tariffs, trade policy, import dependence, China, mobile phones, solar panels, Production-Linked Incentive, protectionism, WITS database 1. INTRODUCTION India’s trade policy has shifted markedly since the year 2014. The Make in India initiative, launched in September 2014, departed from the post-1991 liberalization agenda toward a more interventionist, protectionist approach aimed at boosting domestic manufacturing and reducing import dependency, particularly on China (Athukorala, 2020; Panagariya, 2024). The primaryinstrument used was the import tariff. Between the year of 2014 and 2023, India raised customs duties across multiple sectors, with the steepest hikes occurring in the year 2018–2019 Union Budget; this added 5–15% duties on items ranging from mobile phones and automobile components to textiles and agricultural products (Athukorala, 2020). The simple average tariff peaked at 12.2% during this period, while the aggregate weighted average reached 7.32% in 2015 and the China-specific weighted average peaked at approximately 8.16% in 2020, marking a substantial reversal of the post-1991 liberalization trajectory. This paper hence addresses the question of whether this protectionist strategy achieved its intended objectives. Existing research has documented the shift toward protectionism but largely stopped short of evaluating its outcomes. Panagariya (2024) notes the rise in average import tariffs since 2014, with peaks reaching 12.5% for automobiles, and warns that this trend could jeopardise long-term manufacturing competitiveness. Athukorala (2020) here similarly argues that post-2014 trade policy deviates from the 1991 liberalisation approach, contending that the tariff increases risk jeopardising India’s competitiveness and its integration into the global value chains. Chaudhury (2022) finds that structural obstacles prevented Make in India from attracting substantial foreign direct investment, suggesting that tariff increases alone are insufficient without a parallel improvement in manufacturing capability. Rawat et al. (2021) compare India and China through sectoral case studies and find that while mobile phone manufacturing benefited from tariff protection and the Phased Manufacturing Programme, India’s broader manufacturing performance remains weak, constrained by gaps in infrastructure, productivity, and industrial capacity. Chaudhary (2025) and Chaudhry, Sharma, and Chaudhery (2025) further highlight the persistent imbalances in India–China bilateral trade, noting that it continued its reliance on Chinese imports across several sectors despite policy interventions. None of these studies, however, empirically tested whether tariff hikes actually reduced India’s aggregate import dependence or China’s share of India’s imports; they only described the policy and its structural context without assessing the outcomes against stated goals. This paper, drawn from data of fourteen years at a product-level (2010–2023) from the World Bank’s WITS database, addresses the four research questions: Did India’s average import tariffs rise after 2014? Did higher tariffs reduce total import volumes? Did dependence on Chinese imports decline following tariff increases? Is there a statistically significant relationship between the tariff levels and import dependence? To ground the aggregate analysis in this sectoral reality, the study hence examines two contrasting sectors: mobile phones/electronics and solar panels. The mobile phone sector, supported by the Phased Manufacturing Programme (2017) and the Production-Linked Incentive scheme (2020), is widely known as the Make in India success. Domestic electronics production rose from ₹1.90 lakh crore in FY2015 to ₹9.52 lakh crore in FY2024, with nearly 99% of smartphones sold in India being produced domestically by FY2024. Exports grew from a negligible base in FY2016 to ₹88,726 crore by FY2023, and manufacturing facilities expanded from 3 in 2014 to 268 units by 2018. The solar panel sector illustrates the limits of the tariff-driven policy: despite the 25% basic customs duty on cells and 40% on modules (April 2022), the Approved List of Models and Manufacturers, and an expanded PLI allocation (₹4,500 crore to ₹24,000 crore), India yet remains heavily dependent on Chinese imports which are constrained due to technology dependence, limited manufacturing capacity, high capital costs, and low R&D investment. This underscores that tariffs alone are insufficient, absent complementary factors such as supply chain ecosystems, technology transfer, and firm-level capabilities. Research objective This study pursues two central objectives. First, it empirically assesses India’s aggregate and sector-specific tariff trajectory from 2010 to 2023 to determine whether the tariff increases introduced under the Make in India policy translated into measurable reductions in India’s import dependence on China at the product and sectoral levels. Second, through a comparative case study of the mobile phone/electronics and solar panel sectors, it examines why tariff protection succeeded in reducing Chinese import dependence in one sector but failed in the other, identifying supply chain ecosystem development, technology transfer, and firm-level capabilities as complementary factors that mediate the effectiveness of tariff policy as a tool of import substitution. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW This section discusses key perspectives and prior research on