Abstract

This paper compares BRICS and the QUAD to examine how each grouping contributes to the emerging multipolar international order. It compares their objectives, membership, institutional design, economic role, security role, and global governance influence. Using a qualitative comparative approach, the paper argues that BRICS contributes mainly through economic reform, development finance, monetary cooperation, and Global South representation, while the QUAD contributes through Indo-Pacific security coordination, maritime cooperation, public goods, and support for a rules-based regional order. The comparison shows that contemporary multipolarity is not simply a contest between Western and non-Western powers. It is increasingly shaped by overlapping platforms, issue-based cooperation, and strategic hedging. India’s participation in both BRICS and the QUAD is central to this argument because it demonstrates how states use different groupings for different purposes while preserving strategic autonomy.

 Introduction

The international system in the twenty-first century is moving away from the unipolar moment that followed the Cold War. During the 1990s, the United States and Western-led institutions strongly influenced global economic, security, and normative agendas. Over the last two decades, however, the rise of new economic powers, renewed great-power competition, and dissatisfaction with existing institutions have produced a more contested and plural order. Multipolarity in this context does not only mean the redistribution of military power. It also includes changes in economic weight, institutional influence, technology governance, development finance, and diplomatic bargaining capacity.

This shift has encouraged states to rely increasingly on flexible forums rather than only on universal multilateral institutions or formal military alliances. BRICS and the QUAD are two important examples of this pattern. BRICS began as an economic category but gradually developed into a political and institutional platform for emerging powers. It focuses on development finance, reform of global governance, and stronger representation for the Global South. The QUAD, consisting of India, Japan, Australia, and the United States, is an informal Indo-Pacific partnership focused on maritime stability, resilient supply chains, technology standards, and rules-based regional security.

The objective of this paper is to compare BRICS and the QUAD in terms of their institutional design, economic influence, security role, and contribution to the emerging multipolar international order. The paper does not treat them as identical organisations. Instead, it examines how two different forms of cooperation reshape global governance in distinct but connected ways. BRICS is analysed as a reform-oriented platform in global economic governance, while the QUAD is analysed as a flexible security and public-goods partnership in the Indo-Pacific.

The study is guided by three questions. First, how do BRICS and the QUAD differ in their objectives, membership, and organisational structure? Second, how do they influence economic governance, regional security, and global influence? Third, what does their simultaneous relevance reveal about the character of the emerging multipolar order? These questions help move the paper beyond a parallel description of the two groupings toward a structured comparison of their roles.

The relevance of these groupings lies in their different responses to the same structural change. BRICS questions the representativeness of established economic institutions and seeks wider space for emerging economies. The QUAD does not primarily seek to redesign global finance; it works to prevent instability in the Indo-Pacific through coordination among four maritime democracies. Analysing them together is therefore useful because it shows that multipolarity is not produced by one organisation or one ideology. It is produced by multiple forums acting in different policy areas at the same time.

A further reason for comparing the two groupings is India’s unusual position. India is not merely a member of both; it is one of the few major states whose foreign policy links economic reform with maritime security. In BRICS, India can argue for institutional reform without abandoning existing partnerships.

In the QUAD, it can strengthen Indo-Pacific cooperation without accepting a formal alliance. This dual position makes India a useful case for understanding how middle and rising powers behave in a multipolar environment. It also prevents the paper from reducing global politics to a simple China-United States rivalry. India’s conduct shows that agency in the new order comes from selective participation, not permanent alignment. This makes the BRICS-QUAD comparison analytically relevant, because it captures how states combine reform, stability, autonomy, and bargaining leverage across different forums. Such behaviour is central to modern multipolarity, where influence often depends on flexibility rather than loyalty to one institutional camp or strategic bloc.

The academic contribution of this paper lies in comparing BRICS and the QUAD not as simple rivals, but as different models of cooperation under multipolar conditions. BRICS reflects demands for a more representative economic order, while the QUAD reflects security coordination in the Indo-Pacific. Studying them together shows that the current order is not organised through rigid Cold War-style blocs. It is shaped by overlapping memberships, strategic hedging, and issue-specific partnerships. The next section reviews major debates on multipolarity, BRICS, the QUAD, and multi-alignment.

Literature Review

The literature on multipolarity generally begins with criticism of the post-1945 institutional order. Rached and Rodrigues de Sá (2024) argue that institutions such as the IMF and World Bank continue to reflect mid-twentieth-century power distributions despite major shifts in global economic weight. Kutlay and Öniş (2020) describe the present period as marked by hybridity and a clash of norms, where liberal internationalist ideas coexist with growing demands for sovereignty, institutional reform, and economic self-determination. These studies are useful because they show why emerging powers seek alternative forums and greater representation.

Recent official documents also make the topic more contemporary. The BRICS 2026 official platform identifies the expanded grouping as a forum of eleven countries, including Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia. On the QUAD side, the Wilmington Declaration and later official statements highlight maritime domain awareness, coast guard cooperation, logistics, health security, technology, and critical infrastructure. These developments show why older explanations of BRICS as only economic and the QUAD as only military are insufficient.

Scholarship on multipolarity can be divided into two broad perspectives. The first views multipolarity as a corrective process. From this perspective, rising powers seek fairer participation in global decision-making, and BRICS represents a collective Global South demand for reform. The second perspective is more cautious. It argues that multipolarity may create instability because emerging powers do not necessarily share the same political systems, economic priorities, or security interests. This debate is important for BRICS because the grouping contains both cooperation and contradiction.

Studies on BRICS focus on its movement from an investment acronym to a political and institutional grouping. Anagba et al. (2026) view, BRICS as an actor that supports a multipolar world by challenging the dominance of Western-led institutions. Kaushik, Mahipal, and Patel connect BRICS expansion with wider changes in global economic governance. Obajinmi and Garba highlight the bloc’s growing relevance in trade, energy, and finance. Bawaskar, however, stresses the expansion paradox: a larger BRICS may gain visibility but may also face greater difficulty in reaching common positions because its members have diverse interests.

The literature on BRICS is therefore divided. Supporters see it as a platform for reformed multilateralism, South-South cooperation, and development finance through institutions such as the New Development Bank. Critics emphasise internal limits, including different political regimes, economic priorities, and security concerns among members. BRICS should therefore not be presented as a single anti-Western alliance. It is better understood as a flexible coalition that seeks reform while managing diversity.

The QUAD literature is usually framed around the Indo-Pacific. Chowdhary presents the QUAD as a normative and strategic stabiliser supporting a rules-based regional order. Vinodan and Kurian describe it as a form of strategic hedging that allows members to cooperate without creating a formal military alliance. Mungray sees the QUAD as a strategic counterweight that coordinates democratic powers in areas such as maritime security, infrastructure, critical technology, and supply-chain resilience.

There are also competing interpretations of the QUAD. Some scholars understand it mainly as a security framework aimed at balancing China’s growing regional influence. Others argue that the QUAD is not a treaty alliance but a flexible minilateral platform that combines maritime security with public goods such as vaccines, climate cooperation, infrastructure, cyber security, and technology standards. This distinction matters because the QUAD’s influence comes not only from military coordination but also from its ability to shape regional norms and provide practical cooperation.

Existing literature presents two contrasting perspectives. One school views BRICS as a transformative force capable of reshaping global governance, whereas another argues that its internal diversity limits collective action. Similarly, scholarship on the QUAD is divided between those who interpret it as a balancing coalition against China and those who view it as a flexible provider of regional public goods. Despite these debates, few studies compare both organisations using a common analytical framework. This paper addresses that gap through a systematic six-dimensional comparison.

Theoretical Framework

This paper uses four connected concepts: multipolarity, reformed multilateralism, strategic hedging, and soft balancing. Multipolarity provides the broad structural lens. It refers to a system in which power is distributed among several influential actors rather than concentrated in one hegemon. In the current period, this diffusion includes economic capacity, military strength, technology leadership, institutional influence, and symbolic authority. BRICS and the QUAD both emerge from this wider diffusion of power, although they respond to it differently.

Reformed multilateralism explains the BRICS agenda. It assumes that global institutions must adapt when power distributions change. BRICS members argue that institutions created after 1945 do not adequately represent emerging economies and the Global South. The demand for reform in the UN Security Council, IMF, World Bank, and development finance architecture reflects this logic. The New Development Bank is important because it gives BRICS an institutional instrument to support development finance and infrastructure without claiming to replace existing institutions.

Soft balancing explains much of the QUAD’s role. Soft balancing involves the use of diplomatic coordination, institutional cooperation, technology standards, maritime awareness, and public goods to limit the dominance of a stronger regional actor without creating a formal military alliance. The QUAD’s work on maritime domain awareness, coast guard cooperation, cyber security, critical technologies, health, and infrastructure fits this approach. It strengthens regional balance while avoiding the legal obligations of a treaty alliance.

Strategic hedging or multi-alignment connects the two cases. It explains why a country such as India can participate in both BRICS and the QUAD without treating them as mutually exclusive. Through BRICS, India supports economic reform and Global South representation. Through the QUAD, it strengthens Indo-Pacific security cooperation. These concepts provide the analytical basis for the methodology and the comparative analysis that follows.

This theoretical combination is necessary because neither realism nor liberal institutionalism alone fully explains both cases. A realistic reading helps explain the QUAD’s concern with regional balance and the avoidance of dominance in the Indo-Pacific. A liberal institutionalist reading helps explain why states still invest in institutions, declarations, development banks, and working groups. Multipolarity theory explains the wider distribution of power, while strategic hedging explains why states avoid permanent alignment. The paper therefore uses these concepts together rather than treating one theory as sufficient for the whole study.

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of the Study. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework guiding this study. It demonstrates how BRICS and the QUAD represent complementary institutional responses to the emerging multipolar international order through distinct yet interconnected economic and security functions.

Research Methodology

This study uses a qualitative comparative research design. It compares BRICS and the QUAD to understand how two different international groupings contribute to the emerging multipolar order. The comparison is based on six indicators: objectives, membership, institutional design, economic role, security role, and global influence.

The study relies on secondary sources, including academic articles, official summit declarations, policy documents, institutional reports, and recent material on BRICS expansion and QUAD initiatives. The purpose is not to rank the two groupings numerically but to evaluate how they reshape global governance and regional order through different mechanisms.

Secondary data were collected through purposive sampling of peer-reviewed journal articles, official summit declarations, government policy documents, institutional reports, and publications issued between 2016 and 2026. Information from multiple sources was triangulated to improve reliability and reduce source bias.

For consistency, each case is examined using the same questions. What is the grouping trying to achieve? Who participates in it? How formal or informal is its institutional design? What economic functions does it perform? What security role does it play? What influence does it exercise on global or regional order? This structure prevents the paper from describing BRICS and the QUAD separately without comparison. It also allows the conclusion to identify the specific contribution of each grouping to multipolarity.

The study has several limitations. First, both BRICS and the QUAD are evolving rapidly, meaning that new developments after the completion of this research may influence their institutional roles and policy priorities. Second, the study relies exclusively on secondary sources, including academic literature, official documents, and institutional reports, without incorporating primary data such as interviews or surveys. Third, the qualitative comparative approach enables in-depth analysis but does not provide statistical measurement of institutional effectiveness. Future research may employ quantitative techniques, case-study approaches, or expert interviews to further evaluate the long-term impact of both organisations on the evolving multipolar international order.

BRICS Analysis: From Economic Forecasting to Geopolitical Consolidation

Perhaps the most defining global change of the last two decades is the BRICS evolution. What started off as a grouping merely for demographic projection has transformed into a formidable political force since its formal inauguration in 2008. Whereas previously one might hear it being dismissed as a disparate entity by its detractors, the dramatic expansion in 2024, which saw Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE join its fold, has ushered in a completely new persona for the grouping. “The addition has indeed transmogrified BRICS into a ‘geostrategic network’ with considerable clout over the arteries of global trade and energy production.” This is by virtue of the fact that by becoming so large it has moved beyond simply a tool for the rhetorical grievances against the global order, and acquired tangible strategic command over the economic drivers of global affairs.

A vital part of the strategy for BRICS lies in the creation of an alternative financial order, to reduce dependence on traditional financial centres, which can best be termed the ‘third wave’ of global finance. As Sumant Kaushik points out this movement attempts “the re-creation of financial flows and balance of power between North and South on a more equitable footing.” Both the establishment of the New Development Bank, and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, can be said to offer ‘safety nets’ for the emerging world that feels excluded from the Bretton Woods order. Moreover, the establishment of the NDB as a mechanism for the promotion of sustainable infrastructure and renewable energy projects reinforces the pragmatic nature of its South-South Cooperation efforts. Combined with the steady march towards de-dollarisation, national currencies, and other instruments for cross border payment, it is no exaggeration to posit that this is a bloc that is actively working to diversify the world’s economies, and re-balance the global power hierarchy to ensure greater strategic autonomy.

In global governance terms, BRICS should be considered as the premier institution of ‘reformed multilateralism’. As Joseph Anagba et al., write the bloc uses its combined might to “overcome the bipolar dominance of global politics and re-democratize international decision-making processes”. At the heart of this reformist ideology lies an adherence to non-intervention, sovereign equality and respect for states’ territorial integrity. It is a bloc which actively compliments rather than undermines the existing international order and strengthens it. Through this action it provides the much-needed platform in the UN Security Council, and the IMF, for the voices of the Global South to be heard. Although the fact that its economic clout does not translate into equivalent power within these institutions should not be used as justification to delegitimise its push for such voices to be heard, especially when economic power no longer resides solely in Western capitals.

However, one should not disregard the potential risks of the ‘expansion paradox’. Diversity will invariably include new regional and historical conflicts between members of the grouping, which will affect policy making and attempts at forming a coherent strategy amongst them all. However, despite this, it is precisely by its flexibility, transactional nature and pragmatism, even if it precludes it from becoming a disciplined alliance, that it can best maintain its relevance as an alternative nexus for countries wishing to diversify alliances and to seek a vehicle for economic revisionism and strategic dialogue.

QUAD Analysis: From Maritime Security to Indo-Pacific Strategic Coordination 

The revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue reflects the changing security environment of the Indo-Pacific. The QUAD first emerged after the 2004 tsunami and was revived in 2017 as strategic competition in the region intensified. It is not a formal military alliance like NATO. Instead, it is a flexible diplomatic partnership among India, Japan, Australia, and the United States, allowing coordination on shared concerns without binding defence obligations.

The QUAD’s central objective is to support a free, open, stable, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. This agenda is linked to maritime security, sea lanes, trade routes, energy flows, and respect for international law. Through maritime domain awareness, freedom of navigation, coast guard cooperation, and transparency, the QUAD seeks to prevent regional instability and limit the dominance of any single power. Its role is therefore not only military but also regulatory and normative, as it supports openness, rules, and access in Indo-Pacific waters.

In recent years, the QUAD’s security role has expanded beyond naval cooperation. Initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, the Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission, humanitarian assistance, and logistics-related cooperation show a practical approach to regional security. These initiatives help regional partners monitor illegal fishing, dark shipping, and coercive maritime behaviour. They also show that the QUAD works through capacity-building and information-sharing, not only through strategic signalling.

The QUAD has also developed a broader public-goods agenda. Its cooperation now includes critical and emerging technologies, resilient supply chains, cybersecurity, health security, clean energy, infrastructure, disaster response, semiconductor supply-chain resilience, and secure digital connectivity. These areas show that the QUAD has evolved from a security dialogue into a wider platform addressing both traditional and non-traditional security challenges. This is important because many Indo-Pacific states seek stability and development options without being forced into a binary choice between major powers.

Technology and economic security have become central to the QUAD’s influence. In the twenty-first century, strategic power is not limited to military strength; it also depends on standards, digital infrastructure, data flows, supply chains, and secure connectivity. The QUAD’s work in these areas shows how regional security is increasingly linked with technological and economic governance.

India’s role is central to understanding the QUAD’s place in multipolarity. India has avoided turning the QUAD into a formal military pact, but it uses the platform to strengthen maritime cooperation and protect its Indo-Pacific interests. At the same time, India remains active in BRICS and supports reform of global economic governance.

This dual engagement reflects strategic hedging and shows that the QUAD is not simply a bloc against another bloc. It is part of a wider pattern in which states use overlapping partnerships to expand autonomy and influence.

The QUAD’s informal design also creates limitations. Since it is not a treaty alliance, it cannot provide automatic security guarantees. Its members also differ in their economic relations with China and in their domestic political constraints. Australia and Japan are closer treaty allies of the United States, while India follows a more autonomous foreign policy. These differences do not make the QUAD ineffective, but they explain why its cooperation remains selective, gradual, and issue-based

Comparative Analysis

Table 1: Comparative Analysis of BRICS and the QUAD

Discussion

The comparative findings demonstrate that BRICS and the QUAD represent distinct yet complementary institutional responses to the ongoing transformation of the international system. Rather than functioning as mutually exclusive geopolitical blocs, both organisations contribute to multipolarity through different mechanisms. BRICS primarily seeks to reform global economic governance by advocating greater representation for emerging economies, strengthening South–South cooperation, and promoting alternative development financing through institutions such as the New Development Bank. Conversely, the QUAD focuses on preserving regional stability by strengthening maritime security, promoting technological cooperation, and supporting a rules-based Indo-Pacific.

These findings reinforce the argument that contemporary multipolarity differs significantly from the bipolar competition that characterised the Cold War. Instead of dividing states into rigid ideological alliances, the current international system is increasingly characterised by overlapping institutional memberships and issue-specific partnerships. India’s simultaneous participation in both BRICS and the QUAD illustrates this transformation. Rather than choosing between competing blocs, India pursues strategic autonomy by engaging in multiple institutions that advance different national interests.

The study also contributes to the growing literature on strategic hedging and multi-alignment. Existing scholarship often examines BRICS and the QUAD independently, thereby overlooking how states simultaneously utilise economic and security-oriented institutions.

By comparing both organisations using a common analytical framework, this research demonstrates that global governance is becoming increasingly fragmented yet interconnected. Economic reform, technological cooperation, maritime security, and development finance are no longer pursued through a single universal institution but through multiple overlapping platforms that perform complementary governance functions.

The findings of this study both support and extend existing scholarship on multipolarity and strategic autonomy. Hall (2016) argues that India’s foreign policy increasingly reflects multi-alignment rather than exclusive alliance commitments, a conclusion reinforced by India’s simultaneous participation in both BRICS and the QUAD. Similarly, Pandey and Yadav (2025) emphasise that India’s engagement with these two platforms reflects a strategy of balancing economic and security interests rather than choosing between competing geopolitical blocs. However, unlike previous studies that analyse BRICS and the QUAD separately, this research demonstrates that both organisations should be understood as complementary governance mechanisms operating across different dimensions of the emerging multipolar order. This comparative perspective contributes to a broader understanding of how institutional diversity increasingly shapes contemporary international relations.

From a policy perspective, these findings suggest that policymakers should recognise multipolarity as a process of institutional diversification rather than institutional replacement. Emerging powers are increasingly creating new platforms while simultaneously participating in existing international organisations. Consequently, the future international order is likely to depend upon cooperation among multiple institutions rather than the dominance of any single geopolitical bloc. Overall, the findings indicate that the emerging multipolar international order is increasingly characterised by institutional complementarity rather than geopolitical exclusivity. Instead of replacing one another, BRICS and the QUAD perform distinct but interconnected governance functions, reflecting the growing importance of flexible, overlapping, and issue-specific institutional arrangements in contemporary international relations

Conclusion

This paper compared BRICS and the QUAD to examine how both contribute to the emerging multipolar international order. The comparison shows that the two groupings should not be treated as direct rivals. BRICS contributes mainly through global economic reform, South-South cooperation, development finance, and greater representation for the Global South. The QUAD contributes through Indo-Pacific security, maritime stability, technological cooperation, and support for a rules-based regional order.

The main finding is that contemporary multipolarity is not shaped by fixed blocs, but by overlapping and issue-based partnerships. India’s participation in both BRICS and the QUAD demonstrates this pattern. Through BRICS, India supports a more representative economic order, while through the QUAD, it strengthens its maritime and strategic role in the Indo-Pacific.

Overall, BRICS reflects the demand for reform, while the QUAD reflects the demand for stability. Their coexistence shows that the future international order will depend on how states use multiple institutions for different purposes. Future research can examine how BRICS expansion, QUAD initiatives, artificial intelligence governance, digital currencies, climate cooperation, and resilient supply chains further shape the evolving multipolar order. Ultimately, the coexistence of BRICS and the QUAD demonstrates that twenty-first-century international politics is increasingly characterised by institutional pluralism, strategic flexibility, and complementary governance rather than exclusive geopolitical alignments.

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