Article Curated by Team No. 0425B1-LAW,
Team members – Sina Yigzaw, Upasana Vyas, Swathi and Navya Oberoi.
Team leader – Upasana Vyas

THEME 1:

WAREFARE REIMAGINED

In the modern world, the nature of warfare has undergone tremendous change. The
traditional battlefields of land, sea, and air are no longer the only domains, as technology
not only affects our ability to interact and communicate but also how we fight. Conflict has
therefore spread into unorthodox but no less potent domains: cyber and outer space. Data
theft, espionage, and digital destruction are some of the tactics used in cyberwarfare to
destroy society without firing a single shot. And when satellites that serve as
communication, surveillance, and navigational tools become strategic assets and targets,
space, which was once a symbol of human discovery, becomes a new battlefield, raising the
possibility of conflicts outside of Earth. As countries compete for power in these developing
domains, determining the legality, responsibility, and future of conflict under international
law becomes extremely important.
Cyberattacks can be anonymous and without physical presence, making it difficult to
pinpoint the perpetrator. This complicates both the response and accountability. Consider
the infamous Stuxnet malware, which was allegedly developed by the U.S. and Israel to
thwart Iran’s nuclear program, or the 2007 attacks in Estonia, which are ascribed to Russian backed forces. The threat extends beyond sabotage; disinformation tactics intended to sway
public opinion or topple governments constitute a new kind of psychological warfare that
damages society from within.
Targeting space infrastructure can have far-reaching impacts because satellites are used for
both military and civilian purposes, attacking them could cause radiation or debris, interrupt
internet access and emergency response systems, and endanger civilian lives. A new era of
space militarization has begun with the demonstration of anti-satellite capabilities by
nations such as the United States, Russia, China, and India. There is a grey area and worries
about its weaponization because the 1967 Outer Space Treaty forbids the use of mass
destruction weapons in space but permits regular military operations. Conflict has become
more complex due to the merging of cyber and space, which calls for a comprehensive
defense plan that combines technological knowledge with moral and legal considerations.
When referring to such topics, we shall mention International Humanitarian Law (IHL),
particularly Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the Geneva Conventions, as it has been protecting
civilians during armed conflicts throughout history. Principles like distinction, proportionality,
and precaution are emphasized in Article 49.3 of AP I and are applicable to all forms of
warfare. These ideas still hold true today even if they were developed prior to the
emergence of cyber and space warfare
It is important for us to realize that action that do not result in physical destruction can still
qualify as “attacks” under IHL. In the Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić case, the International
Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia made it clear that the term “attack” should be
interpreted broadly, and not just as physical destruction. This interpretation aligns with
contemporary warfare, where IHL’s rules may apply to acts that do not cause bodily damage.
The blurring frontiers in cyber and space warfare make assets used for both military and
civilian objectives a particularly challenging problem. The concepts of proportionality and
differentiation, however, still hold true when attacking dual-use items; the harm must be
proportional with the military advantage, and every attempt must be made to avoid civilian
harm.
While the fundamental tenets of IHL remain applicable, our legal systems need to adapt the
realities of modern conflict. The protection and rights of persons displaced by war will also
be covered by these frameworks, which is where refugee law enters the picture. Above all,
humanity’s well-being and civilian safety must remain at the heart of all warfare regulation,
regardless of the domain.

THEME 2:

THE REFUGEE PARADOX

A family flees their homeland, dodging bullets, starvation, or perhaps a government that
thinks they’re better off dead. They claw their way across borders (barely alive), dreaming of
safety in a shiny, developed nation—those who roar of human rights and a restaurant on
every corner. And what do they get? A one-way ticket back to the hell- hole they had just
escaped, did I mention “barely alive”? courtesy of the same countries that love to lecture
the world about “humanitarian values”
Welcome to the modern refugee crisis, where international law is just a suggestion, and
humanity is apparently out of stock.
The 1951 Refugee Convention, that noble relic of post-World War II optimism made by the
victors of World War I, who saw the second world war and realized we really do have to care
about the other ordinary humans (post-war guilt). Article 33(1) lays down the sacred
principle of non-refoulement—no sending refugees back to places where their “life or
freedom would be threatened” due to race, religion, nationality, or membership in a
particular group.
Sounds alright, right? Except, of course, for Article 33(2), the loophole that whispers,
“Unless they’re a security risk,” which apparently includes anyone who looks at a border
guard funny.
Then there’s the 1967 Protocol, which graciously expanded this protection beyond Europe’s
war-torn past, because apparently it took 16 years to realize persecution isn’t a continent specific happening.
The 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol don’t just ban refoulement; they outline a buffet
of refugee rights—work (Article 17), education (Article 22), housing (Article 21), and the
freedom to move (Article 26). These aren’t optional extras; they’re binding on signatories.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 14) and the Convention Against Torture
(Article 3) double down, affirms the right to seek asylum and avoid return to their country.
Non-refoulement is even customary international law, binding everyone in this world,
signatory or not.
As of mid-2024, the UNHCR counted122.6 million forcibly displaced people, including 43.7
million refugees. Where exactly are they? Not sipping chai-tea lattes in New York or strolling
Paris boulevards. No, 75% of refugees are hosted by low- and middle-income countries, per
UNHCR’s 2023 Global Trends Report
The refugee crisis has been politically weaponized, with refugees portrayed as economic
burdens or national security threats, despite data suggesting their long-term contributions to host economies.
Developed countries, despite their legal obligations for the customary law, have employed
tactics like externalizing borders and refusing the refugees (barely alive) calling them a
security threat to their nation—e.g., Australia’s offshore processing or the EU-Turkey deal,
denying entry on procedural grounds, and limiting asylum grants through rigorous screening.
“Why should the developed nations bare all this trouble” well—The U.S. has 3.8 million
square miles of land, much of it being emptier (You can hear a pin drop during its most busy
days).
On the other hand, developing nations often lack legal frameworks yet they still permit mass
entry, sometimes under general humanitarian considerations. Developing nations like
Jordan, Ethiopia, and Bangladesh continue to serve as frontline states for refugee influxes,
doing so in the name of humanity. These nations, are already dealing with severe economic
and political struggles, managing large populations of refugees with minimal external
support (No international funding)
Lebanon, where 1.5 million Syrian refugees strain a nation of 5 million. Developing states
aren’t just resource-poor; they’re often next door to the conflicts, making them first stops by
geography, not choice.
International law demands equity. The Convention’s preamble calls for “international
cooperation” to avoid undue burdens on any state. The 2018 Global Compact on Refugees,
non-binding but symbolic, urges “burden-sharing.”
That’s the refugee crisis in 2025— betrayal of compassion and accountability sets the stage
for the next theme, which reveals how these same nations have further distanced
themselves from their obligations—not only through neglect but by erecting digital barriers,
transforming the refugee experience into one of surveillance and exclusion, which
undermines the very human rights they profess to safeguard.

THEME 3:

DATA VS DIGNITY

Imagine fleeing war, persecution, or famine, only to be met not with sanctuary but with
scanners, algorithms, and biometric checkpoints. This is the reality for many refugees in the
21st century. Today’s governments aren’t just building fences, they’re coding them. The
tools may be new, biometric databases, mobile phone extractions, predictive algorithms, but
the outcome is familiar: exclusion and control. These digital tools often violate the very
human rights they claim to protect. Refugee rights are not optional. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees everyone, citizens or not,
fundamental rights like privacy (Article 17), non-discrimination (Article 26), and freedom of
expression (Article 19). Yet, digital surveillance often tramples these guarantees in the name
of efficiency and security. Take biometric identification systems, widely used by
humanitarian agencies like the UNHCR. These systems collect fingerprints, facial scans, and
iris data. Refugees are rarely in a position to give genuine consent, refusal can mean denial
of aid, food, or asylum. Try saying no when your child hasn’t eaten in days. In the U.S. and
Europe, border agents have been known to download entire phone contents, chats, photos,
locations, without warrants. This isn’t protection; it’s a digital strip search.
Fairness is another concern. Surveillance tools, especially AI, driven systems, show biases.
Refugees from countries like Syria or Somalia may be flagged more often than those from
places like Ukraine. These technologies, instead of being neutral, perpetuate discrimination.
Self, censorship soon follows. Refugees begin to limit what they post, say, or organize,
fearing their actions might be monitored and used against them, or worse, shared with
regimes they fled. This chills freedom of speech, association, and even religion. Across
regions, the impact varies but shares common threads. In the EU, the Eurodac system was
initially meant to prevent double asylum applications. Now, it feeds into law enforcement
databases, creating digital dossiers on refugees. Errors are not uncommon and have led to
wrongful detentions or denial of services, with few avenues for redress.
In Lebanon, where millions of Syrian refugees reside, surveillance is deeply entrenched,
even within refugee camps. Facial recognition, movement tracking, and biometric checks are
routine. Refugees report avoiding schools or hospitals, fearing detection and deportation. In
the United States, border agents operate under the “border search exception,” allowing
them to extract data from phones without probable cause. Some asylum seekers report
being confronted with their private messages during interviews, undermining their right to a
fair process.
The root issue isn’t just the tech, it’s the legal vacuum around it. While the ICCPR remains a
vital framework, it was not designed to regulate AI or mega biometric databases.
Enforcement is patchy, and legal remedies are almost non-existent for stateless refugees
with limited access to legal aid. Even humanitarian actors are entangled. Agencies like the
UNHCR collect data with good intentions, efficiency, fraud reduction, and aid distribution,
but when this data is shared with governments, it risks misuse. The “humanitarian
exception” becomes a backdoor for mass surveillance. Consent in such situations is
conditional, and protection often secondary.
So, what’s the path forward? First, international legal frameworks must be updated, think of
it as “ICCPR2.0 for the digital age.” Refugees should have rights to access, correct, and
withhold their data without facing punishment. Surveillance systems must undergo
independent audits and judicial review. Technology can work for refugees too, privacy,
preserving systems that limit data, anonymize information, and allow for automatic deletion
should be the standard. Finally, the UN and its agencies must lead by example, championing
ethical data practices and resisting overreach. A dedicated mandate on digital refugee rights
is long overdue. Refugees are not threats or data points, they are human beings with dignity
and rights. As surveillance expands, we must not let it become just another wall in the
fortress world. It’s time to put people before programs and rights before risk assessments.

THEME 4:

ENVIRONMENTAL EXODUS

Today, refugees are not only people running away from war or political problems. Many are
also forced to leave their homes because of climate change. Things like rising sea levels,
floods, droughts, and wildfires are making it hard for people to live in their own countries.
These people are often called “climate refugees.”
But there is a big problem: international law does not protect climate refugees. The 1951
Refugee Convention only helps people who are escaping from persecution based on race,
religion, nationality, or political beliefs. It does not include people who leave because of
environmental issues. As a result, climate refugees are left without legal rights or support.
The world is changing, and so should our laws. Millions of people are being forced to move
due to climate change, but they do not get the same help as people escaping war. This is not
just a legal problem; it is also a moral issue.
In 2018, the Global Compact for Migration talked about climate-related migration, but it
was non-binding, meaning countries don’t have to follow it. Some countries try to help, but
their actions are not strong or the same everywhere. This shows how weak the current
system is when it comes to protecting climate refugees.
Climate displacement is not only about rising sea levels. Other problems, like deforestation
and water pollution, also push people out of their homes. For example, during the Syrian
refugee crisis, refugees living in Lebanon and Jordan had very poor access to clean water.
The sudden rise in water use caused shortages and pollution. This led to diseases like
cholera and typhoid in the refugee camps.
Another modern cause of displacement is cyberwarfare. This means using technology to
attack important systems like electricity or water. If a cyberattack shuts down these systems,
it can make places unsafe or impossible to live in. These people also don’t get legal
protection because the law has not yet recognized such threats as a reason for being a
refugee.
So, there is an urgent need for better laws to help people who are forced to move because
of climate change and cyberattacks. Just like refugees fleeing war, climate refugees also
deserve protection and support. The 1951 Refugee Convention must be updated to include
them.
In conclusion, the number of people being forced to move due to climate change is
growing fast. Current refugee laws are not enough. The world must act quickly to change
these laws and help those in need. It’s not just something we should do; it’s something we
must do.

REFERENCES:

THEME 1 –

Ian Traynor, ‘Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia’ The Guardian (17
May 2007) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia
Ellen Nakashima and Joby Warrick, ‘Stuxnet was work of U.S. and Israeli experts, officials say’
The Washington Post (2 June 2012): https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/stuxnet-was-work-of-us-and-israeli-experts-officialssay/2012/06/01/gJQAlnEy6U_story.html
Diakonia International Humanitarian Law Centre, ‘Conduct of Hostilities: General Principles’
(2024) https://www.diakonia.se/ihl/resources/international-humanitarian-law/conduct-ofhostilities-general-principles-ihl/
Diakonia International Humanitarian Law Centre, ‘Conduct of Hostilities: General Principles’
(2024) https://www.diakonia.se/ihl/resources/international-humanitarian-law/conduct-ofhostilities-general-principles-ihl/
Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaškić (Trial Judgment) ICTY-95-14-T (3 March 2000) para 180.
ICRC, IHL the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts, (2024), 58.
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) 1125 UNTS 3 (adopted 8
June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978).

THEME 2 –

UNHCR REPORT – https://www.unhcr.org/bg/18727-mid-year-report-2024.html
UNHCR’s 2023 Global Trends Report- https://www.unhcr.org/global-trends
EU-TURKEY DEAL- https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-towards-a-newpolicy-on-migration/file-eu-turkey-statement-action-plan
2018 Global Compact on Refugees- https://press.un.org/en/2018/ga12107.doc.html
Refugee Convention- https://www.unhcr.org/about-unhcr/overview/1951-refugeeconvention
1967 Protocol- https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/4ec262df9.pdf
Refugees long-term contributions to host economies –
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/news/new-report-reveals-refugees-profoundeconomic-contributions-and-integration-united-states
Developing nations managing large populations of refugees with minimal external support –
https://www.icmpd.org/blog/2023/a-perfect-storm-of-crises-why-refugee-hostingcountries-need-more-support
1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon – https://www.refugepoint.org/the-syrian-refugeecrisisexplained/#:~:text=Lebanon%3A%20Hosting%20approximately%201.5%20million,Zaatari%20or%20within%20host%20communities.
The Convention’s preamble calls for “international cooperation” to avoid undue burdens on
any state – https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/legacy-pdf/4ca34be29.pdf

THEME 3 –

Jacobsen, K. L. (2017). On humanitarian refugee biometrics and new forms of intervention.
Journal of
Intervention and State building, 11(4), 529,551.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2017.1347856
Ajana, B. (2013). Asylum, Identity Management, and Biometric Control. Journal of Refugee
Studies, 26(4), 576,595
UN Human Rights Committee. (1988). CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to
Privacy). UN Human Rights Committee. (2004). CCPR General Comment No. 31: The Nature
of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant. UNHCR. (2018). Policy on the
Protection of Personal Data of Persons of Concern to UNHCR.

THEME 4 –

https://www.unhcr.org/
https://www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-displacement
https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-compact
https://www.hrw.org/
https://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html
https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/syrian-crisis
https://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity
https://www.theguardian.com/world/climate-change