The Crime-Terror Nexus: How Organized Crime Fuels Global Terrorism
By Muskaan Grover, Richa Sharma and Vivek Jha
The crime-terror alliance or nexus refers to various degrees of collaboration between terror groups and criminal syndicates. These alliances can range from temporary and opportunistic to long-term mutually benefiting associations. This convergence of various crime networks and terrorism has emerged as one of the biggest concerns in the global security scenario. These alliances have evolved into efficient operational networks of transnational terrorism and crime. Earlier, terror and crime were seen as two different schools of thought motivated by ideological and profit motives respectively. However, in recent times, these lines have blurred significantly, leading to intricate relations between both entities for the motive of mutual benefits.
The Rationale Behind Crime-Terror Alliances
The alliance between terrorist groups and organized crime is based on financial motivations, operational benefits, and strategic needs. While terrorist organizations suffer from funding constraints because of international sanctions; criminal networks accumulate billions through illicit activities including drug trafficking and human trafficking as well as arms trafficking and financial laundering. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2020 the illegal drug trade generates more than US $300 billion annually which serves as a vital funding source for criminal and terrorist organizations. On one hand, terrorists receive access to safe smuggling paths and financial laundering options along with black market arm deals from these alliances on the other, criminal organizations gain protection influence, and logistical capabilities from terrorist groups. In areas with weak governance, crime-terror alliances establish parallel economic systems that make state action challenging. Both groups obtain ideological and strategic benefits from these alliances because of their shared interests in weakening authorities and growing operations while evading detection.
The Convergence and Alliance Theories
Convergence Theory
This theory states that over time, the inherent differences between the actions and objectives of terrorist and criminal organizations have reduced significantly, leading to a blending of activities and operations.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Cocaine Trafficking
FARC in Colombia followed the path of convergence. Although, it started as a radical ideologically driven terrorist group however with time it started associating with various criminal organizations and adopting activities like drug trafficking, to fund its operations. Over the period, it also began producing and exporting cocaine, raising its status to one of the biggest traffickers in Latin America (Azizi et al., 2024).
The Taliban and the Drug Trade
Another prominent example of convergence theory is the Taliban’s involvement in the opium trade. The involvement provides substantial funds to the Taliban and also helps them maintain better regional stability. Earlier they used to tax opium farmers for funds, but with time they have started participating in the production as well as the supply of opium. Afghanistan contributes to around 86% of the world’s opium trade with a very significant part of production and trade owned by the Taliban which helps them generate approximately US $500 million annually (UNODC, 2022).
Abu Sayyaf and Kidnapping for Ransom
Abu Sayyaf, originally a jihadist group, with time, evolved into a fully functioning criminal syndicate. initially, they took on activities like piracy but later hostage-taking became their primary source of revenue replacing the ideological funding. They demanded ransoms as high as US $10 million per hostage from governments and corporations (Horgan & Taylor, 1999).
Alliance Theory
Alliance theory states that terrorist and criminal organizations retain and maintain their inherent differences and only collaborate when mutual interests are involved (Makarenko, 2004). These collaborations are mostly transactional and temporary in nature. Each group holds its identity and stance but benefits from other’s resources.
Hezbollah and South American Drug Cartels
The Lebanese militant group, Hezbollah, has long been linked to various drug cartels that exist in Latin America. Hezbollah provides various forms of logistical and financial services to drug cartels instead of producing the opium on its own, in return it gets a share of the profit generated. The area between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay also known as The Tri-Border Area (TBA) acts as a hotspot for operations driven by Hezbollah, where billions of dollars of drug profits are distributed to Hezbollah’s global network (Levitt, 2013).
The Russian Mafia and the Chechen Rebels
During the Chechen wars, the Chechen terrorist groups formed temporary alliances with local criminal groups which helped them obtain weapons, fake passports, and money laundering services, in return the terrorist groups helped these criminal organizations find various smuggling routes (Makarenko, 2004).
Understanding the Different Types of Alliances
Alliances formed by terrorist organizations are interest-based. Alliances with other terror groups, states sponsoring terror, and non-state actors and criminal organizations are some different types of such interests.
Alliance With Other Terror Groups
Terrorist groups form alliances to fulfill their objectives of collecting weapons and intelligence, undertaking training, and having significant financial resources and security. It is often argued that a shared enemy and ideology helps terrorists select partners. It is found that terrorist groups that share ideologies and target the same country are more likely to align (Phillips, 2018).
For example, the Taliban supported Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, where the Taliban provided refuge and training grounds for Al-Qaeda operatives. In return, the Taliban gained strategic and ideological backing in the form of foreign fighters and also a heightened global profile.
In another case the establishment of the “caliphate” by ISIS in 2014 allowed it to attract various groups, including Nigeria’s Boko Haram. The alliance between ISIS and Boko Haram offered Boko Haram a global dimension, access to funding, and tactical assistance.
State Sponsors of Terrorism
Terrorist groups also form alliances with states. Bapat and Bond (2012) in the context of their study of civil wars and unrest show that militants who face significant government repression sometimes turn to external state sponsors for collaboration. State-based alliances help terrorist organizations carry out the attacks by getting resources from the state while allowing the state to use the group to project power against adversaries (C. Horowitz & K. Potter, 2014).
Many of the terrorist organizations rely on state sponsors for protection, funding, and resources. States may support terrorism to pursue political goals that are difficult to achieve through conventional military means.
Iran, for example, provides significant financial, military, and logistical support to Hezbollah, a Lebanese militant group. In exchange, Hezbollah serves as an extension of Iranian influence in the Middle East, especially against Israeli and Western interests.
The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence has supported groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb ul Mujahideen and worked with them to promote their propaganda and in exchange, have fulfilled the interests of these terrorist organizations.
Non-state Actors and Criminal Organisations
In addition to alliances with other terrorist groups and state actors, many terrorist organizations align themselves with non-state actors such as criminal organizations, human trafficking rings, or arms dealers. These groups provide essential resources like funding, weapons, and illegal markets for the sale of goods and services.
Terrorist organizations like the FARC in Colombia are the best examples of operational links between international organized crime and terrorism. It has been known to collaborate with drug cartels to fund its operations. In exchange for trafficking protection or joint control of territories, these groups help each other sustain their activities. FARC uses financial gains earned from trafficking to obtain advanced weaponry and telecommunications.
Another domain where terrorists and criminals have found an attractive opportunity to collaborate with each other is maritime piracy. The Straits of Malacca, the Suez and Panama canals, and oil commerce-intense traffic places are the most vulnerable places to attack by these collaborations (Viano, 2020). They are not only stealing the high-profit cargoes, but also taking control of lethal cargoes such as chemicals, gas, arms, and specialized dual-use equipment. Al-Shabab, an Islamist insurgent group based in Somalia is an example of profitable ties with piracy, kidnapping, and other illegal activities.
Countering Alliances In The Terror World
A principal characteristic of terrorism is personal security which distinguishes it from other forms of violence. While in cross-border aggressions or potential nuclear war situations leaders or military establishments are the real targets; in terrorism, the vulnerable are individuals within the society. Terrorism today is increasingly networked. Not only are the motives, means of sponsorship, and security consequences diverse but also, the reach is more global and lethal (Lesser, 1997). Terrorist groups form alliances to expand their capabilities, gain access to more resources, and enhance their knowledge (C. Horowitz & K. Potter, 2014).
The formation of such complex alliances has important implications for security around the world. The link between terrorist groups, states, and criminal networks enhances the capability of the groups concerned as well as complicates counter-terrorism efforts. Current law enforcement arrangements are not adequate to deal with decentralized and transnational networks. As a result, terrorist groups are able to improve their methods and increase their sphere through alliances, counter terrorism strategies will also have to improve, by introducing intelligence-centered approaches, preventive policing, and international cooperation.
Terrorism has become transnational and so it requires policies for counterterrorism that have international dimensions in terms of both cooperative efforts and comparative lessons to be learned (Lesser, 1997).
Alliances formed by terrorists hugely influence their behavior. For example, Group A allies with Group B when Group B already has a history of carrying out suicide bombings; in this scenario, it is highly likely for Group A to follow Group B and engage in high casualty tactics. From a policy perspective, it becomes crucial to study such alliances to form exceptional counterterrorism strategies. At a micro level, international organizations track the internal networks of terrorist groups. This helps government officials identify the type and the effectiveness of the attacks to be launched (C. Horowitz & K. Potter, 2014) helping them work on mitigating and deterring such attacks.
A further extension of the same is ‘reactive policing’ and ‘proactive policing’.
Reactive policing entails arrests and detentions of suspects, interrogations, searches, and seizures. Reactive forms of military intervention often use military aid to troops like SWAT teams and hostage rescues. The US invasion of Afghanistan post-9/11 is an example of such reactive policing (Yamamoto, 2017).
Proactive policing however focuses on the use of informers, sting operations, and preventive detentions. Proactive forms of military invention rely on search-and-destroy missions, pre-emptive strikes, targeted killings, and predator drones. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 is often quoted as an example of proactive policing (Yamamoto, 2017).
The function of intelligence is crucial in any counterterrorism effort. The information gathered through observations over a period of time is not only for evidence to conduct successful persecution; it also helps in understanding the larger picture. Surveillance allows intelligence agencies to not only understand the plans of the terrorists and measure the threats they pose, they also help destabilize the terrorist network so that they fail to execute their plans (Yamamoto, 2017).
It is important to make information on terrorism more transparent among international agencies. Air and space power can contribute to strengthening such transparency. Space-based surveillance, reconnaissance aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles to expose terrorist camps are also ideal for making proper use of air and space power for countering terror activities (Lesser, 1997).
Terrorism has become a much more diverse problem. From drug trafficking, and crime to its asymmetric strategies, countering it will always require ever-evolving policies and techniques.
Conclusion
Modern terrorism operates beyond standalone group actions because it maintains global networks of alliances that strengthen both its operational survival and destructive capabilities. The combined forces of terrorism with organized crime deliberate state support and non-state entity partnerships lead to more complicated and unpredictable threats that are hard to dismantle. To match this evolving threat counterterrorism measures need to be dynamic by uniting intelligence sharing with technological advancement and international cooperation. The comprehensive and adaptive approach remains the sole effective method for nations to tackle the expanding threat of terrorist alliances along with its related impacts.
References
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