Authors : Tanuj Samaddar , Md. Rizwan , A. R. Sangeetha , Ankush Kumar 

A showcase of power shifts between America and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the South China Sea (SCS) has become a vortex for geopolitics conflicts to this day. The area is pertinent not just in terms of plain maritime territoriality-in fact, it happens much beyond such facets in entwined elements involving military strategies, financial influences, and legal diplomacy. Under the aegis of customary international law as spelled out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the United States, following a liberal internationalist model, advocates the sanctity of freedom of navigation (FoN). On the other hand, China has systematized a Sinocentric story of regional hegemony via the institutionalization of its nine-dash line claim, which has been legally rejected (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2016) but continuously advanced in evidence.

Simultaneously, the transnational interface between environmental conflict and human rights diplomacy within this theatre accentuates the multidimensional complexities of statecraft. Particularly with respect to the rights of Indigenous and coastal peoples, environmental degradation aggravated by militarization, resource exploitation, and climate-induced vulnerability is frequently entangled with the degradation of human rights. The juxtaposition of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the US-led Blue Dot Network further underscores an emerging bifurcation in global infrastructure diplomacy. The contrast of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the US Blue Dot Network emphasizes dualism.

The current discussion attempts to clarify these issues by merging comparative evaluations of US-China strategic postures in the South China Sea, investigating the dialectics of human rights diplomacy versus environmental concerns, and deconstructing the infrastructural competition between the Belt & Road Initiative and Blue Dot Network. The research paper would allow us to better understand the links that lead to this multifaceted conflict.

The strategic competition that has unfolded in the South China Sea has been extensively discussed in academic circles, with much focus being placed on hard-power maneuvering with different narratives about the significance of international law: US-China competition, manifesting clearly through structural power shift leading to hegemonic struggle (Mearsheimer, 2014) . The US strategic pivot was rebranded as the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” in order to reflect a new containment doctrine in respect of China’s “peaceful rise” narrative (Bader, 2012).

Beckman on the other hand highlights the legalistic dichotomies defining the conflict, notably the challenge between China’s historical claims and the UNCLOS structure. Fravel (Fravel,2019) investigates the utility of legal warfare (‘lawfare’) as a soft power instrument in contrast with the American reliance on FoN operations (FONOPs) alongside the operationalization of legal warfare.

Despite its exigency, the intersectionality of environmental degradation and human rights violations remains largely unexplored. Environmental governance is seen as a way of human security by scholars such as Rajamani and Peel (Rajamani and Peel, 2021). The reclamation activities of the PRC coupled with overfishing and coral reef destruction—have exacerbated ecological fragility, undermining the livelihoods of coastal communities.

Within the broader geopolitical context, particularly observing the United States’ selective involvement in advancing democracy and environmental justice, (Roth, 2017) challenges the use of human rights as a rhetorical tool in the field of human rights diplomacy. Chinese discourse, on the other hand, presents a different story based on its “community of shared future for mankind” model, even though it is criticized for giving precedence on state sovereignty over general human rights (Alston, 2018). As Keck and Sikkink (1998) contend, the securitization of maritime regulation is stifling but transnational advocacy networks are absolutely vital for bridging these normative divides.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Blue Dot Network (BDN) show two different policies on global infrastructure development as they mirror different philosophical underpinnings and geopolitical needs. Critics observe that the Belt and Road Initiative, as Summers (Summers, 2016) contends, reflect China’s wish to reset the international economic scene using state-sponsored financial instruments notwithstanding debt reliance and ecological consequences. Using openness, accountability, and sustainability standards, the BDN seeks to even out infrastructure funding from a multilateralist standpoint.

Though they have opposing ideologies, the two initiatives present just the same problems. Above all else, the environmental impact of large infrastructure projects under the extractive economies of the BRI or the neoliberal developmentalism of the BDN demand comprehensive ecological reviews. Second, the normative contestations labour standards, Indigenous rights, and participatory governance run counter to added hurdles in their implementation. The US dependence on coalition-building with Quad members stands in opposition to the BRI’s integration within China. The discrepancies highlight the call for a polycentric analytical lens.

The South China Sea (SCS) is an arena of strategic contestations among multiple stakeholders, with the US and China leading the race. It will cover the new geopolitical tensions, maritime disputes, and military confrontations that characterize the region’s modern dynamics, with particular emphasis on the strategic contestations between the two superpowers.

GEOPOLITICAL CONTESTATIONS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 

China’s aggressive territorial claims extending over a whopping 90% of the South China Sea, marked by its so-called “Nine-Dash line,” have led to considerable friction with neighbour countries and external actors including the United States. The results show that China’s land reclamation projects and construction of artificial islands with military installations have heightened tensions in the region (Pham, 2021). These islands are also strategic outposts, and they extend China’s ability to project power and control key maritime lanes.

The United States, on the other hand, has focused on freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) to push back against Chinese unilateral actions. This includes operations by the U.S. Navy to counter excessive claims at sea and to uphold access to international waters (Kaplan, 2022). U.S. conducting of the FONOPs has increased in recent years to emphasize this commitment to a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. But these operations have also raised the risk of military confrontation and accidental escalations.

Economic Consequences and Competition for Resources

The South China Sea is of great economic importance because of its extensive oil and natural gas reserves, rich fisheries, and its vital position as a maritime trade route. According to the findings, China’s extractivist policies, including illegal fishing and energy exploration in disputed waters, have increased regional tension (Liang & Chen, 2021). These activities not only erode the sovereignty of smaller claimant states such as Vietnam and the Philippines, but they also challenge U.S. influence in the region directly.

To counter these actions, the United States and its allies have endeavoured to support regional states, through both capacity-building initiatives and joint naval exercises. For example, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has strengthened partnerships with ASEAN nations, allowing them to improve their maritime domain awareness and deter Chinese coercion. However, the economic interdependence of China and the U.S. complicates their rivalry; two nations deeply connected by trade and investment.

Military Posturing and Strategic Alliances

The militarization of the South China Sea is also an important dimension of U.S.-China contestations. China’s use of its artificial islands to deploy hundreds of anti-ship missiles, radar systems, and fighter jets has transformed the region’s security dynamic, reducing the operational dominance of the U.S. in the Western Pacific (Zhang, 2020). In contrast, the U.S. has reinforced its military posture around the continent with joint exercises with allies like Japan, Australia and India under the QUAD aegis. The exercises are intended to improve interoperability and project a show of force in response to potential Chinese aggressiveness.

The results demonstrate the emergence of the regional balance of power, as well as the involvement of strategic alliances. The Philippines’ move to allow the U.S. expanded access to its military bases under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) mirrors a broader convergence of interests among states across the region to counter China’s surge in assertiveness. But the asymmetric power balances between China and smaller countries complicate matters, as many of these countries are subject to economic or political coercion from Beijing.

BELT & ROAD INITIATIVE V/S BLUE DOT NETWORK

The geopolitical landscape today is highly influenced by the two giants, China and the United States. While the Chinese have been stressing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) since its start in 2013 to gain control over the region, the US’s counter-strategy, along with the QUAD member countries and other countries with the Blue Dot Network, poses no less competition. Most studies claim that the Blue Dot network is a direct counter to China’s BRI. Unlike the BRI, the BDN does not offer any funds or loans for the infrastructural project but serves as a globally recognised seal of approval for major infrastructural projects giving a clear message that these projects are not exploitative. This US initiative sends out signals to all the developing countries in the Asia-Pacific to not rely on the Chinese but rather join hands in the Indo-Pacific partnership. The South Asian region has high potential and resources with respect to economic grounds, making the region a favourite spot for giant countries to try and persuade developing countries to partner with them, giving the giants and sense of control in terms of funding the infrastructure and the financing gap. 

Sustainability

While the BRI aims to enhance economic growth and infrastructure, improving connectivity across participating countries, it also comes with environmental implications and socio-economic dynamics which require careful consideration. A study in 2024 found that although BRI countries have experienced economic growth and improved environmental sustainability,  the factor of trade openness negatively affected CO2 emissions. Energy consumptions hinder economic growth for explainable reasons. The emphasis on eco-friendly policies and the use of renewable energy investments to enhance ecological sustainability needs to increase. (Arif, 2024). Another study in 2024 highlights the risk of debt distress in the recipient countries, discussing China’s influence in countries like the Western Balkans through investments. These also pose geopolitical risks. (Kasmi, 2024). 

While the BRI is a move by China to influence other nations through its funding, the BDN comes with a high-standard certification process to approve infrastructural projects, ensuring they adhere to principles of sustainability, human rights and transparency(Mustoe, 2022). The BDN which is a global collaboration among the US, Japan and Australia, ensures that it promotes shared values in infrastructural development with the aim of a unified approach to sustainability enhancing the effectiveness of these projects. (Kumar, 2020)

Funding International infrastructure

Infrastructure has grown rapidly as a global asset class over the past decade. The blue dot network is a multi-stakeholder initiative bringing together governments, private investors and civil societies to promote high-quality and sustainable infrastructure, trusted for global standards for infrastructural and development . The private investors are major players here. For investors, infrastructure assets offer the potential for further diversification, steady cash flow and predictable real returns for long-term purposes that also match the needs of institutional investors, and for official investors, involvement from private investors can help to manage different risks and deliver better quality projects.  (Rajah, 2020). The BRI and BDN both aim at bridging international investment funding. As of 2020, a study claims that there is $15 trillion deficit between infrastructure needs and actual investment by 2040. The BRI started in 2013, partially as a response to this (Irons, 2023).

The BRI is largely funded by public funding by the Chinese government, which is sourced from Chinese policy banks, such as the China Development Bank (Chan, 2017). Although there is a substantial amount of funding from the private sector, there emerges a viable gap in funding for infrastructural projects, especially in sectors like marine conservation, a salient part of the South Asian Economy (Demirciler, 2022). There is a required potential to develop a funding model involving a balanced approach between private and public funding to tap the BRI’s full potential. On the other hand, the BDN operates alongside existing financial institutions like the US Development Finance Corporation14 (Mustoe, 2022). The BDN also encourages private-public partnerships, leveraging resources and expertise to fund infrastructure projects1315 (Kumar, 2020). Apart from these the BDN also relies on alternative funding sources like the blue bonds, which are financial instruments which are designed to support sustainable marine freshwater projects, whose goals align with the BDI (Althalet et al., 2021). The blue bond market has also seen significant growth with transactions totalling up to USD 5 billion from 2018 to 2022, indicating a clear surge in rising interest in sustainable financing options (Bosmans & de Mariz, 2023). The only prolepsis remains that since the BDN was clearly started as a counter to China’s BRI, this geopolitical factor might influence the investment dynamics in the region. 

ENVIRONMENTAL & HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS

U.S.-China relations are profoundly influenced by environmental and humanitarian concerns, which play a significant role in shaping the overall dynamics between these two global superpowers.

On the ecological front, the United States and China are pivotal in international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, though their strategies often diverge. The United States has primarily concentrated on transitioning to renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind power, as part of its broader strategy to combat climate change. In contrast, China continues to rely heavily on coal for its energy needs despite making substantial investments in clean energy technologies  like  solar and  wind  power  (Smith  2023) .While some collaboration has occurred, particularly under the Paris Agreement, tensions have emerged due to conflicting economic interests. China’s industrial growth, largely dependent on fossil fuels, challenges achieving global environmental goals, resulting in criticism from the United States and other nations  (Johnson  & Lee, 2022). 

Beyond environmental concerns, human rights issues are significant in the complex relationship between the U.S. and China. The United States has frequently condemned China for its human rights record, particularly regarding the treatment of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang, political repression in Hong Kong, and restrictions on freedom of speech and religion (Chang, 2022) .These issues have led to considerable diplomatic tensions, prompting the U.S. to impose sanctions to hold China accountable for its actions. Conversely, China contends that such criticisms infringe upon its sovereignty and asserts that its primary focus is on economic development and poverty alleviation rather than expanding political freedoms .

Trade and economic policies significantly influence both environmental and humanitarian concerns. Disputes between the U.S. and China frequently overlap with environmental issues, as the U.S. has raised concerns about China’s environmental practices in manufacturing and production, which contribute to global ecological degradation . Both countries are vying for dominance in the burgeoning green technology sector, particularly in renewable energy, electric vehicles, and energy storage. Their competition in these industries could profoundly impact global sustainability efforts (Kim & Zhao, 2022). 

Despite these competitive tensions, there remains substantial potential for collaboration in tackling climate change and addressing global humanitarian crises. However, the two nations’ differing political systems, economic policies, and priorities often hinder practical cooperation (Miller, 2021).

In conclusion, environmental and humanitarian concerns are pivotal to the evolving relationship between the U.S. and China. These issues affect bilateral ties and shape global policies and international cooperation efforts. Although there is potential for collaboration, differences in governance models, economic priorities, and political ideologies present ongoing challenges for both nations as they strive to address the urgent environmental and humanitarian issues of the 21st century. The South China Sea is a microcosm of the wider strategic competition between the U.S. and China. Resolving the CCCF requires a consistent commitment to cooperation, the rule of international law, and shared interests in contributing to regional peace and stability in the Indo–Pacific. The South China Sea worthiness for India is a lesson in strategy and economics. Since India is a pivotal country of the region, the enhancement of maritime capabilities and the strengthening of regional partnerships through QUAD and ASEAN must be prioritized in safeguarding their own interests in the Indian Ocean Region. In view of Chinese assertiveness, India must ensure that they are increasing naval deployments and promoting economic and security cooperation with Southeast Asian countries for stability in the region and to secure their trade routes.

Additionally we observe that both BRI and BDN majorly aim to increase the global presence by providing help and support in developing global infrastructure quality, but the approaches adopted by both initiatives are different. The BRI is solely headed by China, who is is trying to enhance its presence in the world in the name of support, and the BDN is a collaborative effort which preserves the social, cultural and economic significance of the region yet with the same goal as the BRI which is infrastructure. Since India is not a part of the BRI, the BDN provides a good partnership for India to achieve its goals which is also on par with the Indo-Pacific partnership and the QUAD. With long-term sustainability goals and an increasing burden on finance, the BDN provides all the reasons for India to be a part of it, balancing out the influence of geopolitical tensions that has emerged out of BRI. 

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