Introduction

Multilateral diplomacy has been determined by international context and relationships among global actors.  According to Abdurahmanlı (2021) “after the disintegration of the USSR in the 90’s, the bipolar system disintegrated and some states gained their independence and turned to multilateral diplomacy and developed both their economic and social relations with this type of diplomacy”. At the same time, “the increasing complexity of international and global politics goes hand in hand with the emergence of new actors. Economic growth has increased in the emerging economies, which include China, India and Brazil” (Mokhtari, 2025). 

Besides, some scholars agree with the statement that the dimensions and coordinates of the multipolar world are still unclear. The world is on the way to creating  and reforming institutions and rules based on international law and cooperation policies. Nevertheless, the shadow of war and the hard power of military means is taking its place alongside the soft power, and it has affected the future of diplomacy, where the Global South is being the geographical area most affected by conflicts. (Mokhtari, 2025) 

Diplomacy has been transformed from a primarily states-oriented business to a multi-oriented activity focused on global governance, in order to face the challenges of an increasingly interconnected world (Adiputri, 2025). In this regard, a question has been revealed: how can multilateral diplomacy be reinvented in a multipolar world characterized by geopolitical rivalries? Thus, our research aims to answer this issue through a general objective: To analyse trends in current multilateral diplomacy in the context of a multipolar world in the economic, military and political spheres, through case studies of emerging powers (India and Nigeria), and their role in the reform of multilateral institutions.

1. Emerging Powers and limitations of multilateral institutions in a Multipolar World:

1.1 Emerging power and their diplomacy

As the unipolar dominance of the post-Cold War era diminishes, rising powers are not simply responding to global shifts , but they are  actively shaping them through strategic ways. Each state follows unique diplomatic paths, influenced by their distinct historical backgrounds, geopolitical goals, and institutional perspectives. 

Among these actors, Russia is notable for its assertive realism and gradual geopolitical tactics. Its interventions in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Syria (2015) exemplify Moscow’s efforts to reassert influence across key regions (Makarychev, 2017). Besides, Russia uses its veto power at the UN Security Council to position itself as a defender against Western-led liberal norms. Its foreign policy spanning energy diplomacy in Europe and arms sales in the Middle East aims to weaken Western unity while promoting a multipolar world centered on sovereignty and the influence of great powers. 

Meanwhile, China’s ascent globally is powered by a dual diplomatic approach that combines innovation in international institutions and assertive nationalism. Launched in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) now covers over 140 countries, turning economic investments into strategic influence. At the same time, China has established alternative institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and increased its leadership roles in organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In this perspective, since 2019, China’s “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy”(Grau, 2022) has intensified nationalist messaging and challenged Western criticisms regarding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, representing a clear shift from Deng Xiaoping’s quiet rise strategy. This stance also features aggressive campaigns against Western luxury brands made in China at low costs, framing them as threats to Chinese industry and nationalism. As a result, China’s diplomatic strategy now extends into economic and cultural spheres, positioning itself as both a constructive force and a challenger to the existing international order.

At the same time, India is taking a diplomatic route that focuses on working through many countries together, emphasizing strategic partnerships. It bridges North-South and East-West divides as a founding member of BRICS (Tripathi,2024) and an important player in the G20 and QUAD. India advocates for a multipolar international order by pushing for reforms in the UN, citing its democratic credentials, large population, and economic growth. Its leadership in climate summits, digital infrastructure projects, and vaccine diplomacy indicates its desire to be a developmental model and a global bridge-builder. India balances soft power outreach with regional hard-power strategies, especially in countering China in the Indo-Pacific region.

 In a similar vein, Brazil’s diplomacy emphasizes soft power and regional engagement. Within groups like IBSA, BRICS, and the G20, Brazil promotes comprehensive global governance, advocating for WTO reform, climate justice, and the democratization of the UN. It prioritizes peaceful conflict resolution and South-South cooperation. Besides, Brazil’s environmental efforts particularly Amazon conservation and its peacekeeping roles in Haiti and Lusophone Africa emphasize its normative goal of being a consensus-builder on the world stage.

Complementing these efforts, South Africa continues to play a key role both symbolically and strategically in shaping a more balanced global order. Through its involvement in the African Union, BRICS, and IBSA, it consistently pushes for greater African representation on the UN Security Council and advocates for reform of the Bretton Woods financial institutions. Rooted in its post-apartheid legacy, South Africa’s diplomatic approach emphasizes justice, multilateral cooperation, and a focus on developmental peacebuilding. Its leadership during debates over COVID-19 vaccine equity and its active contributions to peacekeeping missions in the DRC and Sudan emphasize its position as a critical link between the continent and broader global power structures.

1.2 Limitations of Current Multilateral Institutions

Multilateral institutions were created to promote peace and solve global and transnational challenges that require multilateral cooperation. However, with the growing complexities of the modern world, along with various other threats, these institutions fail to cope with them. In this article, we highlight the limitations of the current multilateral institutions which are responsible for constraining their growth and preventing them from fulfilling their motto. 

The most visible cracks appear in the decision-making processes due to political differences, which arise out of political divisions among the member states within the UN Security Council. The veto power of the permanent members often leads to blockages or dead ends in the decision-making processes, as many times the national interests are prioritized by the countries. From a realist perspective, Mearsheimer (1995) states that such institutions often lack the autonomy to revoke the interests of powerful states. But the problem is not only confined to politics; it lingers around economic and regional factors equally. The financial constraints faced by the UN and other countries limit the resources required to help countries facing crises such as natural calamities. 

Meanwhile, the nature of global challenges has also transformed dramatically over a few decades. There are increasing cases of modern warfare, emergence of non-state actors, issues of sovereignty, and doubts about legitimacy. This new type of conflict, such as climate-induced displacement and transnational terrorism, is still out of the UN’s understanding and coverage. There is limited empirical work on the long-term impact of UN-responsive institutional learning in peace missions.

2. The Influence of Regional Military Strategies on Multilateral Diplomacy. Case of Studies: Nigeria and India. 

 2.1 Nigeria’s Military Strategic Challenges and Influence on Multilateral Diplomacy

Nigeria’s military tactics and its impact on regional diplomacy are pretty complex. While Nigeria is the biggest player in West Africa making up over half of the region’s economy and home to around 220 million people the country faces some serious challenges that limit how it can engage with other nations. Its military mainly focuses on fighting terrorism, keeping regional stability, and leading peacekeeping efforts. Still, challenges like irregular warfare, inefficient operations, and not enough investment keep holding it back.

The fight against Boko Haram and ISWAP and EIGS has dragged on for over 14 years without a clear win. By late 2023, more than 93% civilians and security personnel had lost their lives (Centre d’études stratégiques de l’Afrique, 2024), and over 2 million people had been displaced (UNHRC, 2022). Despite deploying over 100,000 troops since 2015 and launching multiple offensives, Nigeria’s military struggles to keep up with the insurgents’ quick, decentralized tactics. Because of this ongoing conflict, Nigeria has turned to multilateral military groups like the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which includes Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin. Nigeria contributes about 70% of the troops and takes on most of the leadership roles. The force had some moments of success like regaining territory near Lake Chad in 2016 but overall, its effectiveness isn’t always consistent.

A 2022 security review by ECOWAS showed that only about 62% of planned operations actually took place, mainly because of funding problems, poor coordination, and bad teamwork among the countries’ forces. Although the African Union and European Union have promised financial help, less than half of what was promised for MNJTF had actually been delivered by mid-2023. On the home front, Nigeria’s defense efforts are hampered by budget issues and weak institutions. In 2023, the government put around ₦2 trillion ($2.8 billion) into defense about 12.5% of the total national budget (Reuters, October 30, 2023). But according to Transparency International’s Defense Integrity Index (2022), Nigeria ranks high for corruption, with roughly a quarter of defense spending disappearing each year due to fraud, mismanagement, and accountability problems. This financial waste seriously hurts the military’s ability to operate effectively and retain regional influence.

At the same time, Nigeria’s role in international military missions is shrinking. It used to send a lot of troops to ECOWAS and UN peacekeeping missions, but between 2015 and 2023, Nigeria reduced its troop deployment, this decline limits Nigeria’s voice and power in multilateral diplomacy, especially as it tries to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. However, these challenges have also pushed Nigeria to focus more on diplomacy. It’s actively involved in organizations like ECOWAS, the African Union Peace and Security Council, and the UN, pushing for collective security efforts. For example, Nigeria led peace negotiations in Mali and Guinea in 2021–2022, using both its military strength and diplomatic influence.

2.2 India’s Strategic Signaling Under Domestic Pressure

With the emergence of an increasingly multipolar world, India – an important player in the South Asian Region – finds its approach to multilateral diplomacy rapidly evolving. Foreign policy paradigms remain increasingly dependent on not just external actors but also internal constituencies and domestic political imperatives. This creates both opportunities and constraints. 

This importance of India as an important player, in this section, is situated in the context of post-COVID19 pandemic dynamics, and the incumbent government headed by Prime Minister Modi amongst others. India’s foreign policy, for most part, has walked a tightrope in a volatile international system marked by major conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and potential Cold War dynamics between the West and the Russia-China axis. For instance, at the onset of and through the Russia-Ukraine conflict, “to maintain balance between the Western bloc and Russia Indian foreign policymakers have taken a very cautious approach to keeping proximity with both blocs” (Bose, 2024). This complex dynamic has reinforced India’s commitment to strategic autonomy, but domestic pressures have influenced how this autonomy is exercised in multilateral settings.

India’s foreign policy and strategic posturing has historically depended on three main pillars. These include the non-aligned stance rooted in Independence history), rising expectations within the South Asian Region, and an imperative for self-reliance (Singh & Pandey, 2025) . In recent years international diplomatic successes are increasingly leveraged for domestic political gain. This is exemplified in the 2024 general elections wherein India’s improved global positioning became a key campaign point for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Vaishnav & Mallory, 2024).

Alternatively, this becomes a vulnerability in sensitive issues such as that of Kashmir (Saroj Kumar Aryal & Sania Muneer, 2023). The conflict remains international in terms of regional conflict (diplomatic context) meets crucial nuances relating to Indian administration (domestic stances).

Strategic posturing and multilateral diplomacy is also now more influenced by electoral cycles and domestic affairs and vice versa. For instance, the farmers’ protests in 2020 through 2024 (demanding legal assurance on Minimum Support Prices and loan forgiveness) has affected India’s stances in international economic forums and multilateral frameworks like the WTO and G20 (Bawa & Sodhi, 2024). 

India’s strategic signaling, one one hand, relies heavily on domestic support and approval and can limit India’s flexibility in international negotiations. Furthermore, needing such domestic support can be a hindrance to prompt decision making in multilateral forums. On the other hand, this domestic pressure becomes a testament to India’s democratic nature and diverse populace, which in turn provides solid legitimacy in its representation of perspectives in global institutions. 

As India continues to rise as a major power in the South Asian region, and the Global South in general, this relationship between domestic pressures and multilateral diplomacy can be expected to remain the same, perhaps even intensify. It will continue to remain an undeniable influence in its bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, in its leadership in climate and sustainable development related goals, and in other multilateral forums like global economic forums. India’s success in the realm of foreign policy will, in significant part, be demonstrated by its success in balancing domestic pressures with international concerns. This balance will be crucial as India seeks to establish itself as a leading voice in the emerging multipolar order.

3. Reforming Multilateral Institutions for a Multipolar World

3.1 UN Security Council Reform 

The Security Council (UNSC) is the main United Nations (UN) body for the maintenance of international peace and security and its resolutions have binding power. Since its inception, its main challenge has been the integration of its members and its inability to manage international crises due to a lack of consensus among its permanent members.

The Security Council is currently composed of five permanent members (P5) – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and Russia – with veto power over substantive decisions, and ten non-permanent members with two years of membership, distributed by geographic area. Although the UNSC does not expressly foresee that non-permanent members have to be elected on the basis of regional considerations, it is true that the practice follows a pattern of geographical representation. Thus, seats are distributed in such a way that three are allocated to the African group; two to the Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean and Western Europe and Others groups, respectively; and, finally, one to the Eastern European group (Cabrera, 2024).

In the last few years, there has been a process of calls by members of the United Nations General Assembly to reform this body, which determines the most important decisions in the multilateral arena. “The idea of UNSC reform has piqued the interest of both politicians and academics because the reform plan that passed to the UN General Assembly in 1994 has yet to be revised” (Stewart, Mbete, et al., 2023). These attempts and proposals for Security Council reform have been motivated by the lack of representation of developing countries, the Latin American and Caribbean regions, the emergence of emerging powers such as India and Brazil, and the lack of consensus within the permanent members of the Council to address contemporary conflicts. This last regard has its antecedents in the Rwandan genocide, the Syrian crisis during the Arab Spring, and recently, the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

According to Raquelme & Sepulveda (2021), “the aim of the reform process is to transform the Council into a more democratic, representative and transparent body”. Some authors, such as Cabrera (2024), consider that this concern arose as a consequence of the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. This context has highlighted the Council’s limitations and challenges in terms of the preservation of international security. Its inability to evolve in accordance with current geopolitical realities has raised numerous criticisms about its lack of representation, legitimacy and effectiveness as a consequence of the institution’s anachronism. (Cabrera, 2024).

According to Hidayah, “the veto is a sticking point, namely article 27 of the UN Charter, where it is used to defend the veto without the word formally appearing in the text”. Moreover, developing countries are not adequately represented in the Security Council. The majority of UN members are from developing states, yet this proportionality is not reflected in the Council.

The High-Level Panel proposal – under the administration of Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General – “was a proposal by the High-Level Panel (HLP) to correct the imbalance of presentation in the Security Council in compliance with General Assembly Resolution 52(2) in accordance with the Millennium Declaration” (Nwalie, 2022). In this draft proposal, potential permanent members focus on Japan, India, Germany, Brazil and Nigeria on criteria relating to the UN’s financial contribution, relevance in the regional space and peace and security missions. It also suggests the incorporation of more countries in the non-permanent seats in order to equalise representation.

On the other hand, another proposal was made from the African region, the Ezulwini Consensus (7-8 March 2005). Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt were the main contenders for the proposed permanent seats allocated to Africa, but were unsuccessful (Ogbu, Precious et al., 2023).

Despite the existence of various draft proposals around the issue of reforming the Security Council, there is no consensus on its membership, concerning permanent or non-permanent seats; on how such an adjustment should be made in relation to under-represented regional groups (such as Africa and Latin America); or on whether new categories of membership – hybrid or semi-permanent – should be created. In addition, there are controversial questions regarding the veto and its eventual extension (or not) to new permanent members. (Riquelme & Sepúlveda, 2021)

Furthermore, the P5 insists on keeping the Council’s composition intact in order to maintain its hegemony, arguing that increasing the number of permanent and non-permanent members will limit the Council’s decisions. Meanwhile, there is no clear evidence of a possible reform of the Security Council despite the intentions of several nations, organisations and especially developing countries.

3.2 Modernizing Economic Institutions

The world is not unipolar anymore, with the United States at its core; rather , it is swiftly evolving into a multipolar global order dominated by growing economies such as China, India, and Brazil, as well as regional blocs. In this regard, the International economic architecture must upgrade to stay relevant by reflecting the changing economic realities of the multipolar world. 

With the arrival  of the Global South, the unipolar global economic structure has unlocked the gateway for  a  complex multipolar one. Alternative models such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and organizations like the AIIB and New Development Bank are presenting a greater risk to Western dominance. These institutions shift the economic gravity from the rich trans-Atlantic democracies to countries like India , Indonesia, and Nigeria (Peters, 2023, p. 1653). With its trade surpluses, technical improvements, and expansion from 2% to over 18% of world GDP (PPP), China in particular plays a catalytic role (Siddiqui, 2020) . In the meanwhile its influence alarms us about its possible hegemony.

The need to modernize institutions requires not only technical changes but also an intellectual shift that challenges established conventions and encourages multipolar collaboration. This perspective criticizes neoliberal institutions and envisions a multipolar world rooted in  equity and social justice (Ding, X., Weng, Z., & Shang, Z., 2025). But there is  an absence of  empirical and policy oriented analysis for strategic implementation of policies.

Economic institutions must become more adaptive , decentralised and inclusive in order to better reflect the regional diversity and rapidly emerging power blocks like BRICS and ASEAN. In this light , Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is presented as a prototype for modernizing economic institutions more flexible, pragmatic and with greater concern over regional conditions (Vlados et al., 2022). Though the literature cautions that new globalization could intensify the digital and institutional disparities, there is a gap pointing out the necessity for inclusive and participatory efforts for global justice and fair development.

Some gradual reforms like the G20 which has taken the place of the G7 as the main platform for global economic coordination, featuring wider representation and initiatives have been launched to alter IMF quotas to better reflect current economic realities, but progress has been minimal. “BRICS’s most notable achievements have been in the area of financial cooperation” (Sawal & Anjum, 2023). Though important questions still remain: Will nations outside of the BRICS join or borrow from the NDB? Do they think it’s more accessible than the World Bank or IMF? Moreover, global organisations have not adequately responded to this transformation, which is evident in the existing difference in the governance framework in IMF quotas for non-Western states with low representation and the institutional stagnation in the WTO.

It becomes clear that modernizing economic institutions is both  important  and  timely. There is a great need for thorough restructuring measures to ensure the relevance and legitimacy of these institutions . Thus, there is an ongoing discussion  on how best these institutions can be transformed but there is also a widening recognition that adaptability, inclusivity, and fairness should be the essential considerations of  modernizing Economic Institutions.

Conclusion

As the global landscape advances from unipolarity toward a multipolar world order, the re-invention of multilateral diplomacy is not only needed, it is necessary, if not urgent. Structural reform and new cooperation mechanisms are essential to overcoming the challenges of institutional inertia, geopolitical competition and regional security concerns

The context of multilateralism today is complex and dynamic. There is a growing polarisation of politics and geopolitical tension among global actors (mainly the United States, the European Union, China, Russia), which complicates cooperation, decision-making, policy implementation and political dialogue among states in multilateral structures. 

Moreover, the emergence of global players and emerging economies (BRICS) has led to a change in the international order and balance of power. For that reason, it’s crucial a better representation of countries from the global South in international decision-making, especially within the UN Security Council. However, the lack of consensus among developing countries and the hegemony of P5 with their veto power have rolled back all attempts for reforming this UN organ. 

Concerning modernizing Economic Institutions, there is an emerging consensus that adaptability, inclusivity and fairness should be its key concerns. Without comprehensive measures these institutions would lack legitimacy in the swiftly evolving multipolar world.

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