Introduction
Tuvalu and Kiribati, two low-lying island nations in the Pacific Ocean, are at the forefront of climate-induced migration discussions. With average elevations barely above sea level, these countries face existential threats from climate change, including rising sea levels, increased frequency of extreme weather events, and environmental degradation. These challenges not only jeopardize the habitability of their homelands but also compel communities to consider migration as a viable adaptation strategy. Understanding the environmental and geographic vulnerabilities of Tuvalu and Kiribati is crucial to comprehending the drivers behind this migration and formulating effective policy responses.
Environmental and Geographic Vulnerability
Tuvalu and Kiribati are two low-flying islands and are majorly composed of coral atolls. Their maximum heights barely graze the 4.5 meters above the sea level mark. This geography renders them vulnerable to the effects of climate change, more so that of the rising sea level. In the coming 30 years, these countries may face at least a 15-centimetre rise in sea levels, regardless of future carbon emission scenarios (NASA,2024). This is highly alarming, bringing along with it natural dangers such as coastal erosion, seawater in freshwater bodies, and massive flooding. These problems pose a deadly threat to the very existence of these two islands.
Adding on to these worrying problems, the two islands are also geographically isolated, cementing the intensity of the risks at their horizons. Far-flung and scattered in the Pacific Ocean, these countries have little access to the outside world. Without access to external resources and technology, their options become very limited. They become dependent on local, climate-vulnerable resources for their livelihood. Which includes agriculture and fishing, both exposed to the evils of climate change.
Weather events such as tropical cyclones are increasing in their commonness and severity thanks to global warming. The Cyclone Pam in 2015 hugely crippled Tuvalu. It lost more than 25% of its national GDP (World Bank, n.d.). Such incidents not only pulverize their housing and infrastructure but also create socio-economic consequences in the long term, such as displacement of the population and loss of livelihoods.
These environmental issues lead to migration trends. In Kiribati, the migration is usually internal. People migrate from the outer islands to the capital, South Tarawa, to seek better livelihood opportunities and living conditions (UNU-EHS, 2015). While in Tuvalu, the migration is both internal as well as external. Most people seek to migrate overseas to truly escape the environmental challenges that they face (UNU-EHS, 2015). But that is very restricted due to strict immigration laws of potential host countries leaving very few options alive for them.
Looking at the social and cultural aspects of their lives, one can see that it is also riddled with threats. The land is an important cultural hub. The reason for a culture to flourish. Migrating from it risks traditional livelihoods and social structures. It is an intense emotional and controversial turmoil for the people. It is not just a relocation of the physical form but the loss of a cultural identity. Throwing it away and reconstructing another identity is a slow and emotionally painful task.
Both the Tuvaluan and Kiribati governments have taken different approaches to fight back these issues. The government of Kiribati has been pushing forward the policy of “migration with dignity” where its citizens procure skills that will equip them in the global labor markets, opening new avenues to migrate more voluntarily and with more dignity (Migration Policy Institute, 2017). The Tuvaluan government has been directing its focus on advocating for stronger global climate action to fight the very need for relocation, wishing for its people to remain on their ancestral islands (IOM, 2012).
In short, the environmental and geographical vulnerabilities of Tuvalu and Kiribati are key drivers of climate-induced migration. Meeting these challenges is a. multifaceted task involving international cooperation to open migration channels, investment in local policies and strategies, and international efforts to reduce climate change. Identifying and responding to these vulnerabilities is the key to facilitating the resilience and sustainability of these island states.
Migration Trends and Societal Impacts
Migration trends in Tuvalu and Kiribati are heavily influenced by environmental degradation and resource constraints, making migration a critical adaptive strategy. Both nations, characterized by small land areas and increasing vulnerability to climate change, face growing populations that outstrip the capacity of their ecosystems and economies to support them. Kiribati, in particular, relies on weak natural resources, contributing to food insecurity while Tuvalu, although slightly better off, is also struggling with limited agricultural land and economic opportunities (“A Climate Justice Perspective on International Labour Migration and Climate Change Adaptation Among Tuvaluan Workers,” 2022).
In Kiribati, overpopulation, especially in South Tarawa, has prompted migration, which between 2005 and 2015 comprised one-third of international migration. Despite such statistics, the migration rate of this island remains relatively low compared to Tuvalu. This is largely due to the limited migration pathways available, especially for unskilled workers. Tuvalu has recorded a high international migration rate of 64%, with migration to countries like New Zealand and Australia being facilitated through programs like the Pacific Access Category (PAC) Visa (Curtain et al., 2019).
Looking ahead to 2050, migration from both countries is projected to increase due to the expected rise in pressure on resources and limited employment opportunities within the countries. While internal migration had certainly provided relief in the initial stages of battling climate change, it has today proven to be inadequate. The ability to migrate internationally is essential for both these island nations as it provides a much-needed income from remittances which in turn support families and communities within these islands, However, while migration offers substantial benefits to the migrants themselves, it has had significant societal implications (Curtain & Dornan, 2019).
The continued migration of the working-age population leaves a gap in the domestic labor market, exacerbating internal challenges for both nations, Economically, both islands also face fiscal challenges. Kiribati’s economy is projected to be heavily reliant on foreign aid and fishing revenues. With a growing youth population and limited formal employment opportunities, the country faces a widening fiscal gap as expenditures on healthcare, education, and social services outpace revenue. Tuvalu’s situation is somewhat similar (Government of Tuvalu et al., 2022).
The societal impact of climate change has further contributed to the issue of migration. Tuvalu faces the imminent threat of rising sea levels and the encroaching sweater destroys not only land but also freshwater resources and cultural heritage (How Tuvalu Is Dealing With Impacts of the Climate Crisis | Pacific Environment, n.d.). Communities are experiencing loss of arable land with traditional crops like taro failing on a routine basis. The government is currency working on a Long-Term Adaption Plan which aims to create raised, safe land and secure vital resources like water, food, and energy for future generations. However, the socio-economic consequences of climate change are felt most acutely by vulnerable populations such as women. They are disproportionately impacted by economic losses even as they are essential figures in community-based adaptation projects (Social Justice Is Climate Justice in Tuvalu | UNDP Climate Change Adaptation, 2024).
Kiribati is in a similar situation – recent studies have shown that the reduced access to clean drinking water is making residents vulnerable to waterborne diseases. Additionally, with food crops being affected by climate change, the residents are now forced to depend on imported and processed foods that are high in fat, salt, and sugar which is contributing to a rise in non-communicable diseases (World Health Organization: WHO, 2024). While the government has introduced several initiatives such as the Te Mamauri project which aims to increase the climate resilience of the national health system, there are limited growth opportunities. Lastly, the gendered nature of climate change is a primary issue since women are responsible for many domestic tasks such as collective water and cooking food – two areas that have faced the brunt of climate change (Haughton et al., 2020).
Political and Legal Challenges
The problem of climate-induced migration from Kiribati and Tuvalu reveals a sharp discrepancy between the economics of national immigration laws and international law and the moral obligation to aid persons displaced by climate change. Despite frequently admitting the issue, developed countries have been reluctant to establish distinct legal paths for climate migrants, citing issues with economic expenses, national security, and the challenge of designating ‘climate refugees’. The 1951 Refugee Convention serves as the foundation for the existing legal system, which falls short in addressing the complexity of displacement brought on by climate change. Low-lying island nations like Tuvalu and Kiribati face an existential threat from climate change, as increasing sea levels, more frequent storm surges, and other environmental changes threaten their ability to support human habitation (Barnett & Adger, 2003).
Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and EU member states have not formally recognized climate change as a valid ground for asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention (McAdam, 2011). The Convention’s definition of refugees centers on the ruling based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, a definition that does not directly encompass environmental displacement (UNHCR, 2023).
Despite being close to the Pacific Islands, Australia has similarly demonstrated an inability to change its policies to address migration brought on by climate change. Although there have been conversations and certain initiatives for temporary workers, there is not an established path for people who have been displaced due to environmental concerns. Although the European Union has discussed climate migration as a group, each member state is still in charge of its own immigration laws. In a similar vein, the US has not established any particular legal pathways for climate migrants during any of its administrations. While acknowledging the problem and considering possible remedies, New Zealand, for instance, has shown a nuanced and changing approach as well, ultimately rejecting the idea of a specific climate refugee visa category (Dyer & Neef, 2023). A limited opportunity is offered to nationals of Kiribati and Tuvalu through New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category (PAC), which grants residency to a tiny quota each year (75 from each nation). This program, however, is not directly related to displacement caused by climate change because it existed before the issue became widely accepted, and candidates must fulfill common immigration requirements, such as receiving a work offer (Immigration New Zealand, 2021).
Developing nations, particularly those within the Pacific region, face a different and difficult dilemma. They are ones to be the first to face the climate change impacts, yet often lack the resources and capacity to both adapt to these changes and accommodate large numbers of climate migrants (Barnett & Adger, 2003). The concept of ‘migration with dignity’ was promoted by former President Anote Tong of Kiribati, who stressed planned migration as a means of adaptation with the goal of supplying skilled workers and preventing a scenario similar to that of refugees (Oakes et al., 2016).
Cooperation at the regional level has some promise. Though there has not been much progress, the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) has talked about skilled mobility (Connell, 2020). While the Kiribati government’s acquisition of land in Fiji is an effort to ensure choices for the future, it is not a long-term solution (Häggström, 2015).
A number of factors contribute to developed countries’ reluctance to establish particular legal paths for climate migrants. Stricter border controls result from national security concerns that frequently portray migration as a possible danger (Wündisch, 2019). Political pressure to limit immigration may come from public opinion and anti-immigrant sentiment that is stoked by nationalist beliefs and economic worries. The economic costs of accepting and integrating large numbers of migrants, especially those who may be recognized as ‘low-skilled’, could also contribute to this reluctance (BLOCH, 2007)
However, the concept of ‘climate justice’ highlights the moral obligations of developed nations. The main causes of human climate change are historical greenhouse gas emissions, which these countries have contributed disproportionately to (Shue, 2017). According to the ‘polluter pays’ theory, the expenses of fixing harm should fall on those who cause it. However, there are disagreements on historical accountability, causality, and states’ capacity to control migration, making the application of this principle in the context of climate migration difficult (McAdam, 2011).
The problem of climate-induced migration from Kiribati and Tuvalu reveals a sharp discrepancy between the economics of national immigration laws and international law and the moral obligation to aid persons displaced by climate change. Despite frequently admitting the issue, developed countries have been reluctant to establish distinct legal paths for climate migrants, citing issues with economic expenses, national security, and the challenge of designating ‘climate refugees’. The 1951 Refugee Convention serves as the foundation for the existing legal system, which falls short in addressing the complexity of displacement brought on by climate change. Therefore future studies should be concentrated on creating practical, morally acceptable, and culturally sensitive solutions that mitigate the oversimplified climate refugee narrative. Despite the practical difficulties, the idea of ‘migration with dignity’ provides a helpful foundation for a more fair and reasonable approach to climatic mobility.
Adaptation Strategies and Global Response: National Resettlement Plans
Rising sea levels, coastal erosion, and extreme weather events have exacerbated the vulnerability of Tuvalu and Kiribati. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), global sea levels have risen by approximately 3.3 mm per year since 1993, and projections indicate a potential rise of 1 meter by 2100 (IPCC, 2021). For nations with an average elevation of less than two meters above sea level, this rise poses an existential threat (Barnett & Campbell, 2010).
Given the imminent threat posed by rising sea levels, Tuvalu and Kiribati have had to consider national resettlement plans as part of their long-term adaptation strategies. Where possible, efforts have been made to relocate communities to higher ground within their own countries. Land reclamation projects, such as those undertaken in Tuvalu, have aimed to create more habitable space. Kiribati has explored the development of artificial islands and sand-filled barriers to prevent coastal erosion (McAdam, 2014). However, given the limited landmass, these measures provide only temporary relief.
Kiribati’s “Migration with Dignity” policy is a proactive strategy to facilitate the relocation of its citizens while ensuring they integrate into host countries with skills and job opportunities. This policy aims to avoid the social and economic hardships associated with forced displacement by preparing migrants to enter the labor market in Australia, New Zealand, and other regional neighbors (Betzold, 2015).
Kiribati’s government took a bold step by purchasing land in Fiji in 2014, securing approximately 20 square kilometers for potential relocation (Hauer, 2017). While initially intended for food security and agricultural use, the land serves as a potential resettlement option for displaced Kiribati citizens should the nation become uninhabitable.
The international community’s response to climate-induced displacement remains fragmented. Bilateral agreements, such as New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category (PAC) and Australia’s humanitarian visa programs, provide some opportunities for migration, but they remain limited in scale (Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012). Moreover, climate migrants are not legally recognized under the 1951 Refugee Convention, making their status uncertain in international law (McAdam, 2017). Advocacy efforts continue to push for legal recognition and enhanced support for climate-displaced populations.
Tuvalu and Kiribati’s strategy combating climate change is thus majorly characterized by migration. However, this undertaking comes with several socio-economic, political, and legal challenges as residents navigate international boundaries, internal pressures, and community dynamics. While both island nations are designing strategies to safeguard future generations, international cooperation is essential to ensure a stronger response to climate change. Ultimately, both island nations – amongst several others – need to adopt a comprehensive approach that protects the unique cultural identities of their citizens, while ensuring climate resilience to local lives.
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