Why does the study of Great powers in International affairs carry great significance ? Because their behaviour affects every state in the international arena. The book “Over the Horizon: Time, Uncertainty, and the Rise of Great Powers” examines how states have responded to the rise of new great powers. David M. Edelstein, the author of this book intends to study the behaviour of great powers and how they interact with each other. And contends that the temporal considerations are central to international politics. He explains how temporal dynamics affect the interaction between existing and rising great powers during power transition.

The book attempts to explain why existing powers sometimes cooperate with the rising power and while sometimes adopt more competitive strategies? John J. Mearsheimer, an offensive realist, argues that in an anarchic international system, states have little choice but to assume the worst about the intentions of other states and to compete with them. Existing great power must assume that the rising power will translate potential capabilities into real capabilities and will surely use those capabilities to its advantage. But over the century it has been observed that existing powers have abetted the growth of rising great powers. Offensive realists have an explanation to the observed cooperation by attributing it to buck-passing, when a state passes the burden of deterring an aggressor to another state while it remains on the sidelines. It suggests that states have shifted to competitive strategies when the rising power becomes sufficiently threatening, but the offensive realism doesn’t specify when this shift ought to take place.

Another alternative explanation for cooperation between existing and rising power is engagement. The existing power adopts cooperation to shape the interests of rising power in such a way that over time it chooses a more peaceful path. G. John Ikenberry, representative of liberal arguments, argues that the existing great power enjoys a dominant position in the international system but it simultaneously worries about its decline in the future. Therefore they establish institutionalised order to assimilate the rising power in its international order and protect its long term interests. Declining powers adopt cooperative approaches in an attempt to push the intentions of a rising power in a more benign direction.

Both the alternative arguments fail to explain the  variation on the spectrum of cooperative and competitive strategies that can be explained by the interaction of rising power and existing great power time horizons.

Existing power needs to address the now-or-later dilemma, the state must decide whether to address the threat now that will be costly for both the existing and the rising power. They will have to forgo the beneficial trade and might lead to preventive war. If the state leaders defer from addressing the long-term potential threat of rising power there might be the possibility of dealing with it as a full-fledged war, which will be costlier than dealing with it now.

Rising power must maintain uncertainty of its long-term intentions. The more uncertainty there is about the threat posed by a rising power, the more difficult it is for the existing power to decide on the now-or-later dilemma. As the existing power becomes clearer about the intentions posed by rising power in the long term, the uncertainty transforms into risk and eventually likely turns into more competitive strategies by the existing power. They must avoid short-term provocations and thus the benefits of patience can alleviate their growth. Rising powers must hide their intentions to fuel their growth which is possible through cooperation with existing power. In this way, the existing power chooses to procrastinate until later for short-term benefits.

Further into the book, the author takes four cases to examine the behaviour of existing power and rising power in the power transitioning period, to explain why at certain periods of time the power transition turned into a war and at another time the transition was peaceful.

In the first case of the rise of imperial Germany in the 19th century, European powers refrained from any effort to balance against rising German power. Other European powers opted to procrastinate because there were more pressing threats to confront rather than addressing the potential German threat. When Europe’s policy did change towards Germany, it was primarily due to a shift in beliefs about Germany’s long-term intentions, and not due to its capabilities.  Bismarck had convinced a sceptical Europe during the two decades of German unification that Germany had no expansionist objectives. He maintained uncertainty in its intentions which explains the cooperation with European powers. When the new German leadership sought more short-term opportunities for gain, the level of concern about long-term German intentions increased consequently. In short, this case reminds us that threats are not just two-dimensional- power and intentions. In fact, there is a third critical dimension- time. It is the interaction of state time horizons that produces cooperation or competition.

The next case study examines the period at the turn of the 20th century when the United States surpassed Great Britain. What is unique about this case of power transition is that it ended without any conflict between the two states. Unlike in the previous case when Germany binded its time, the United States refrained from it. The United States chose to be more opportunistic and pursue its interests sooner rather than later regardless of what signals it might send about the US intentions. This case explains the relative temporal threats. Britain’s most significant immediate threat was the rise of Germany on the European continent. Short-time horizons compelled Britain to accept and accommodate the rise of the United States in the Western Hemisphere and confront the rise of Germany in its geographical proximity. One cannot simply dismiss the British interests, who viewed long-term intentions favourably despite the rise of US capabilities and aggressive nature of the US in  pursuing  its interests. Their shared identity, shared regime and ideology contributed to confidence in long-term American intentions. In a way Britain just did not cede its interests rather entrusted them to the United States.

In the third case study, the author examines the resurgence of Interwar Germany. We might think the European powers must have been sceptical of the reemergence of Germany after the First World War instead cooperation emerged between Germany and other European powers. Germany saw that cooperation could enable it to emerge from its economic predicament. Germany leadership had a long time horizon and maintained uncertainty about Germany’s intentions. As it has happened before, uncertainty serves rising great powers well. As long as there was uncertainty, there was also space for cooperation. Also the European powers were focused on short-term economic challenges. But this cooperative equilibrium broke when Adolf Hilter’s behaviour led to greater certainty about Germany’s malign intentions and relationships in Europe began to shift.

The recent power transition case study examines the origins of the Cold War, in an environment where the immediate threat of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan collapsed. Given the absence of alternative threats and growing concern about long-term USSR intentions, the US transitioned from cooperation in the Second World War to a competitive approach. It is due to the lengthening of US time horizons and alarming indications of the Soviet’s intentions. The USSR was not interested in short-term economic gains which undermined its ideology and its economic system. Stalin was more interested in securing the future of the Soviet for a long-term basis. He thought conflict with the West was inevitable and made little efforts to maintain its uncertainty. While Soviet ideology certainly contributed to the long-term concern about Soviet intentions, it was not determinative. What concerned the US as its time horizons extended was the combination of likely future Soviet capabilities and intentions. This case also contributes to the better understanding of potentially emerging  Sino-US bipolarity.   If the international system transforms to Sino-US bipolarity, it could provide valuable lessons about how states respond to emerging threats in such a context.

US behaviour toward China over the past few decades is the basic question that the book has tried to answer. It has provided the explanation why the US has abetted the growth of China even though it had the potential to challenge the dominance of the US in the international arena. Offensive realists like Mearsheimer have argued that the US as a rational actor should not enrich the potential of its rival. But the US has opted for cooperative strategies towards China for its short-term economic benefits. The US economy has benefited from the import of manufactured goods from China, that too comparatively at a cheap price. After the Cold war, the US was inclined to address the potential threat from China but it all changed after 9/11. When both the states found the common cause in fighting Islamic extremism. China as a rising power has remained patient since it has little to gain and much to lose by resolving uncertainty about its intentions in a negative direction. China’s assertive nature has been limited to only its territorial disputes. The pattern of Sino-US behaviour can be understood with the argument made in this book.

This book has contributed hugely to the literature of power transitions, which believe the material capabilities cause the transitions in international structure.   But the book provided a novel understanding of the role of uncertainty about intentions for a rising power to avoid attention to its advancement. The book has brought to the forefront the significance of temporal interaction in international politics.