Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: When Does Presence Become Influence?

Group Name: September 3 GC (I+L) Publishing

Authors: Sakshi Ghising, Maisha Jannat, Mansi Chaudhary, Rukhsar Tumbi, Anjali Bhati, Akshita

Abstract

Women are usually among the first to bear the costs of war, yet they are rarely the ones deciding how it ends. This study asks under what conditions women's presence in peace negotiations becomes substantive influence over outcomes. Using a qualitative, comparative case study design based on secondary sources, it examines Afghanistan (2005–2020) and Colombia (2012–2016, with implementation traced to 2026) and assesses influence at three levels: the negotiating agenda, the agreement text and implementation. The findings suggest that influence is associated less with how many women sit at the table than with the structure around them. In Colombia, organised advocacy and a formal channel, the Gender Subcommission, were associated with the inclusion of some 130 gender-related provisions, although implementation has lagged. In Afghanistan, women's late and limited access to decisive talks, the absence of women on the Taliban side and the lack of binding commitments left their participation largely symbolic at the national level, despite real influence in local and informal settings. The study argues that presence becomes influence when four conditions combine: timely institutional access, organised civil society pressure, genuine decision-making authority and mechanisms that make commitments enforceable. It closes with practical recommendations for mediators, donors and implementing bodies.

Keywords: women, peace negotiations, substantive representation, Afghanistan, Colombia, gender provisions, implementation

1. Introduction

Peace negotiations are meant to lay the foundation for lasting peace, yet the people shaping them do not always reflect the people most affected by conflict. Women live through the consequences of war and contribute to peacebuilding, but a seat at the table does not automatically give them a say in what is decided there. The real challenge is not simply to include women. It is to ensure that their participation shapes the agenda, the terms of the agreement and its implementation. This study examines that gap through a comparison of Afghanistan and Colombia.

1.1 The problem: presence versus influence

A persistent gap separates how many women sit at peace tables from how much influence they hold. Between 2015 and 2019, women made up only 14% of official negotiators worldwide (Aggestam and Svensson, 2021). Yet numbers tell us little about whether women shape what gets decided. Even when women are given seats, male-dominated institutions, token appointments and elite male control can push gender concerns to the margins (Kostovicova and Paskhalis, 2021). In practice, presence can become symbolic inclusion: a way of satisfying international expectations rather than genuinely sharing power.

Scholars increasingly separate being included from being influential. Paffenholz et al. (2016) found that women's direct inclusion does not, by itself, make agreements more likely to be signed or implemented; what matters is the influence women exercise. Krause (2024) reaches a similar conclusion about agreement content, and Krause, Krause and Bränfors (2018) link women's participation to more durable peace. Much of this work, however, shows what influential participation is associated with rather than explaining how institutional design makes it possible. This study asks which conditions turn a seat at the table into influence over peace outcomes.

1.2 Key concepts

Presence refers to women's participation in formal peace negotiations and related processes. It is observed through the number and share of women in delegations, negotiating teams and decision-making bodies, and through the roles they hold as negotiators, advisers, observers or civil society representatives. **Influence** refers to the extent to which women shape decisions,

discussions and agreements. Because influence can be won at one stage and lost at another, this study assesses it at three levels:

1. **Agenda:** whether women's concerns enter the negotiating agenda and process.
2. **Text:** whether gender-sensitive provisions appear in the agreement.
3. **Implementation:** whether those provisions are carried out.

1.3 Research question and objectives

The study asks: **under what conditions does women's presence in peace negotiations become substantive influence over outcomes?** It has three objectives:

1. to examine the forms of women's participation in the Afghan and Colombian peace processes;
2. to assess the extent to which women shaped the agenda, the agreement text and implementation in each case; and
3. to identify the institutional and political conditions associated with women's presence becoming decision-making influence.

1.4 Scope and argument

The study covers Afghanistan from 2005 to 2020, with particular attention to the 2019 Doha conference, the February 2020 US–Taliban agreement and the intra-Afghan talks that opened in Doha in September 2020. It treats the Taliban's return to power in 2021 as the context in which the limits of that process became visible, not as an outcome the study seeks to explain. In Colombia, it covers the government–FARC negotiations in Havana from 2012 to 2016 and tracks implementation of the gender provisions up to 2026. It relies on secondary sources and does not involve interviews or fieldwork.

The argument is that women's presence does not automatically give them influence. Presence becomes influence when four conditions combine: (1) timely institutional access, (2) organised civil society pressure, (3) genuine decision-making authority and (4) mechanisms that make commitments enforceable. Support from mediators and international actors and the political willingness of the parties shape how far these conditions can operate.

1.5 Significance

Having a seat is not the same as having a voice. Theoretically, the study moves beyond counting women by following influence across the agenda, text and implementation stages within contrasting cases. Practically, it offers mediators, donors and policymakers a clearer sense of what makes inclusion count.

Section 2 reviews the literature and identifies the gap. Section 3 sets out the methodology. Section 4 analyses the two cases and compares them. Section 5 presents the conclusions, policy implications and limitations.

2. Literature Review

Since UN Security Council Resolution 1325, women have gained more access to peace processes, but progress has been slow and uneven. The United Nations now treats women's inclusion as essential to lasting peace (United Nations, n.d.). Simply having women in the room, though, does not guarantee they are heard. This section reviews what existing research says about when presence becomes influence.

2.1 Presence and influence

The literature agrees that numbers alone explain little. Aggestam and Svensson (2021) document how few women negotiate, while Paffenholz et al. (2016) argue that studies should measure influence rather than presence. Krause (2024) supports this: delegations with women are more likely to produce provisions on women's issues, but mainly where those women hold real positions of power. Kostovicova and Paskhalis (2021) explain part of the reason: gendered power relations and male-dominated deliberation can limit women's contributions even when they are formally present. Presence matters, then, but only when it comes with authority over the agenda and the substance of the agreement.

The studies differ in what they measure. Aggestam and Svensson (2021) focus on representation, Krause (2024) on the content of agreements, and Krause, Krause and Bränfors (2018) on durability and implementation. Each captures one stage, and none follows influence across all of them. That is the space this study occupies.

2.2 Conditions that matter

Research points to several connected conditions.

Institutional access and timing. Paffenholz et al. (2016) identify seven modalities of inclusion, from seats in delegations to consultations and post-agreement commissions, and show that each carries a different level of influence. Paffenholz (2015) adds that a role in a delegation or consultative body does not necessarily give women authority over the agenda or the wording of an agreement. Early inclusion is a key process factor.

Organised advocacy. Krause, Krause and Bränfors (2018) found that agreements involving women signatories connected to women's civil society groups contained more political reform provisions and were implemented at higher rates, although their sample was limited to 13 agreements across six peace processes. Paffenholz (2015), drawing on Yemen's National Dialogue Conference, shows the other side: women held a 30% quota but rarely voted as a bloc, which restricted their ability to press common demands. Together these studies suggest that representation becomes meaningful when women have organised networks and shared priorities.

Mediators and international actors. Support from mediators and international organisations can open space for women's organisations to engage the parties, but it cannot compensate for unwilling parties or for women being invited only after key decisions are made (United Nations, 2024).

Political commitment and implementation. Anderson, Urlacher and Swiss (2026) identify feminist mobilisation, women's leadership, national action plans and international mediation as relevant to inclusion. Fal-Dutra Santos (2021) shows that influence during negotiations does not prevent marginalisation afterwards, and Joshi (2025) finds that gender-specific provisions in Colombia were implemented more slowly than gender-neutral ones.

2.3 The two cases in the literature

Studies of Colombia generally describe a process that began without women and changed under sustained pressure from women's organisations (Céspedes-Báez and Jaramillo Ruiz, 2018; Phelan and True, 2022). They treat the Gender Subcommission as a key mechanism (ABColombia, 2018) and document weak implementation (Kroc Institute, 2023; García, 2024). Studies of Afghanistan emphasise women's influence in local mediation, reintegration and community work (Azadmanesh, 2020), the varied ways women positioned themselves within

official bodies (Rivas and Safi, 2022), and the patriarchal power structures that limited their role at the national level (Frogh, 2020; Azadmanesh and Ghafoori, 2020).

2.4 Gap and conceptual framework

Women's seats at the peace table often come with strings attached. Research shows that exclusionary norms, limited access to talks and a gap between global commitments and local politics hold women back (Moaid-Azm Peregrima, 2023; Chilmeran, 2022). But most of this work examines a single case or a single stage of the process, whether representation, content or implementation. Fewer studies follow influence across all three stages in contrasting cases. That is the gap this study addresses. The Afghanistan–Colombia comparison sets a process in which women were associated with gender provisions in the final agreement against one in which they were largely absent from decisive negotiations, and applies the same questions to both.

Drawing on the literature, the study uses a simple framework. Four conditions are examined: institutional access (when and how women entered), civil society involvement (organised advocacy linked to the table), decision-making authority (whether women could shape the agenda and text) and implementation mechanisms (ownership, resources and monitoring). Mediator support and political commitment are treated as the surrounding context. Their association with influence is assessed at the three levels defined in Section 1.2.

3. Research Methodology

3.1 Research design and case selection

This study uses a qualitative, explanatory, comparative case study design. A qualitative approach fits because the question is about how and why influence happens. Statistics can show whether women's presence is linked to better outcomes, but not the mechanisms behind that link, nor tell symbolic presence apart from real influence. A case study approach suits a topic that cannot be separated from its political, institutional and security context. Comparing two cases lets the study see which conditions consistently accompany influence and which hold it back, without attributing findings to the quirks of one setting.

Afghanistan and Colombia were selected purposively because women's groups in both mobilised for a place in peace processes, yet the influence they achieved differed sharply. In Afghanistan, the study covers 2005 to 2020, ending before the Taliban's return to power in 2021. In Colombia, it covers the 2012–2016 negotiations and tracks implementation to 2026.

The cases are not symmetrical. Afghanistan produced no comprehensive agreement and therefore has no implementation record, so the text and implementation levels cannot be compared directly. The study does not hide this. For Afghanistan, text-level evidence is the absence of women's rights provisions in the agreements that were concluded, and implementation-level evidence is limited to commitments such as the 2019 declaration. For Colombia, all three levels can be assessed.

3.2 Data sources and collection

The study relies entirely on secondary and documentary sources: peer-reviewed articles, research reports, policy documents, publications by the United Nations, UN Women and the Kroc Institute, and the texts of agreements. Sources were found through academic databases (e.g. Google Scholar, JSTOR), institutional websites and publicly available online material such as news reports and NGO statements. Searches combined terms such as "women", "peace negotiations", "participation", "gender provisions", "Afghanistan" and "Colombia". The literature covers 2000 to 2026.

Sources were screened by title and abstract, then read in full if they addressed women's representation, access to decision-making, links with women's organisations, barriers, contributions to outcomes, or gender provisions and their implementation. Material was excluded if it fell outside the study periods, did not focus on peace negotiations, or offered opinion without supporting evidence. Sources were judged on authority, transparency of evidence and methods, relevance and recency. Where accounts conflicted, official texts were compared with academic analysis and independent reports. News reports were used mainly for factual details such as delegation composition, not for interpretation.

3.3 Data analysis

The data were analysed using thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006) within a structured, focused comparison (George and Bennett, 2005). Relevant passages were coded under five themes: women's representation; access to decision-making; support from networks, mediators and institutions; barriers to participation; and gender provisions and their implementation.

These themes were then organised under the four conditions of the framework. The same questions were asked of each case, and influence was judged by whether women shaped agendas, decisions or agreement content, not by presence alone. Cases were then compared condition by condition. Because there are only two cases, the findings show what is consistent with substantive influence and do not prove causation.

3.4 Limitations

The study relies on secondary data and includes no interviews, so informal lobbying and behind-the-scenes pressure may be only partly captured and influence may be over- or understated. Evidence is thicker for Colombia than for Afghanistan, particularly after 2020, so some differences may reflect documentation rather than the cases. Two cases cannot be generalised statistically, and the contexts differ in ways, such as the outcome of the talks and the Taliban's position, that cannot be separated from the effect of women's participation. The study therefore aims at analytical, not statistical, generalisation.

4. Data Analysis

4.1 Afghanistan

Presence. Women's participation remained limited despite international commitments. Kamminga, Boswinkel and Göth (2020) compiled exploratory meetings, negotiations and consultations held between 2005 and 2020 and counted those involving women: women took part in 15 of 67, or 22% (Council on Foreign Relations [CFR], n.d.). This records only whether women were present at all, not their share, roles or influence. At the July 2019 intra-Afghan conference in Doha, about 15% of delegates were women (CFR, n.d.). When formal talks opened in September 2020, four women (Fawzia Koofi, Habiba Sarabi, Fatima Gailani and Sharifa Zurmati Wardak) sat on the government's 21-member team, about 19%, while the Taliban team included none (Al Jazeera, 2020; Congressional Research Service, 2020). These measures answer different questions and are not interchangeable.

Influence outside the formal table. Women's influence was strongest in local and informal settings. They mediated local disputes, supported reintegration, helped secure hostage releases and challenged extremist ideas through schools and community groups (Azadmanesh, 2020). Women on the High Peace Council ran a public awareness campaign across 34 provinces in

2014 (CFR, n.d.). Rivas and Safi (2022) caution against reading women's role in such bodies as a matter of representation alone. Afghan women's groups also prepared their own demands for the 2020 talks (VIDC, 2021). Yet at the national level their role was largely symbolic rather than decisive (Azadmanesh and Ghafoori, 2020). Consultative bodies such as the High Peace Council sit lower on Paffenholz et al.'s (2016) scale of influence than direct negotiating roles, and the evidence reviewed suggests no structured channel linked local influence to the national bargaining table. This offers one plausible answer to why local influence did not carry upward.

Timing and authority. The February 2020 US–Taliban agreement was concluded without the Afghan government and without Afghan women, and it contained no provisions on women's rights (CFR, n.d.; US Department of State, 2020). Later negotiators therefore inherited a framework in which women's rights had not been addressed. The July 2019 declaration pledged to protect women's rights, but "within the framework of Islamic values", and was non-binding (Globe and Mail, 2019). The available evidence shows women advocating (Al Jazeera, 2020), but not controlling the agenda or the text. Facing an all-male opposing delegation, they also lacked counterparts who might have reinforced their concerns across the table. Human Rights Watch (2021) later reported women being pushed aside in planning for further talks.

Summary. Women had presence and some influence at the local level, but little over the agenda, text or implementation of the national process. The intra-Afghan talks produced no settlement, and the Taliban's return in 2021 had military and political causes well beyond women's participation. The Afghan case does show, however, what presence without early access, authority or enforceability looks like.

4.2 Colombia

Presence and access. The government and the FARC negotiated in Havana from 2012 to 2016. No women sat on the negotiating teams at the start, and two joined in late 2013, after two of the six agenda points had been settled (Céspedes-Báez and Jaramillo Ruiz, 2018). Women's organisations kept pressing for greater participation and recognition of women's experiences of the conflict (Bouvier, 2016). In 2014 the parties created the Gender Subcommission to review the emerging agreement from a gender perspective (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, 2016). It gave women's organisations, victims, gender experts and LGBTI representatives a way to present concerns, and five delegations of victims, 60% of them women, were invited to Havana (ABColombia, 2018).

Influence on the text. The Subcommission reviewed agreements already reached on rural development, political participation and drugs, and proposed gender-based changes. Its members from both sides agreed on ideas and then pressed them within their own delegations (ABColombia, 2018). The documented results include explicit recognition of women's right to own land, preference for women in land distribution and priority access to subsidies and credit (Salvesen and Nylander, 2017), and the exclusion of sexual violence from amnesty and pardon, with a special team for such cases (Bouvier, 2016; Phelan and True, 2022). These examples show demands becoming specific commitments in the 2016 Final Agreement (Government of Colombia and FARC-EP, 2016). The agreement contains some 130 gender-related provisions (UN Women, 2020), which shows that gender concerns entered the text, though not that women's advocacy alone caused each one.

Limits of authority. The Subcommission could not require the parties to accept its proposals or decide the final text, and it began work after several agenda points were settled (Céspedes-Báez and Jaramillo Ruiz, 2018). Its significance lay in linking civil society advocacy to the drafting process, not in giving women control over final decisions. The talks also took place with guarantor and accompanying countries, but the sources reviewed say little about their specific role on gender, so the mediator dimension is treated here as context rather than a tested condition.

Implementation. Joshi (2025) reports that by December 2022, 67 of the 130 provisions had reached minimum implementation and 24 had not begun. The Kroc Institute (2026a) reports that only 13% were fully implemented in its latest period. These figures use different measures and dates and should not be compared directly. Monitoring found that gender commitments lag behind other commitments because institutions take too little ownership of the gender approach (Kroc Institute, 2023), and further barriers include inadequate resources and political resistance (García, 2024; Kroc Institute, 2022). Joshi (2025) also links better implementation of gender provisions to the accord's overall success, so weak implementation is not only a women's issue.

Summary. Colombia shows that organised advocacy and a formal mechanism can help women influence what goes into an agreement, and that securing commitments is different from ensuring they are delivered.

4.3 Cross-case comparison

The cases are compared on the four conditions in the framework. The comparison suggests Colombia met each condition to a greater degree than Afghanistan, though Colombian access was itself late and incomplete.

Condition	Afghanistan	Colombia
Institutional access	Four of 21 government delegates in 2020; none on the Taliban side; absent from the US–Taliban track	Two women joined in late 2013; Gender Subcommission created in 2014 as a standing mechanism
Civil society involvement	Largely informal advocacy; women's demands prepared separately (VIDC, 2021)	Structured consultation, including victim delegations in Havana, 60% women
Decision-making authority	Delegation mandate set by others; key terms fixed in an agreement women were not party to	Subcommission reviewed draft provisions but could not require acceptance
Implementation	No settlement and no enforceable protections	Some 130 provisions; implementation uneven and lagging

Institutional access. Colombian access was built into the structure of the talks through a standing mechanism, whereas Afghan access was comparatively ad hoc and came after the central framework had been agreed. Neither case offered early access in the full sense: Colombian women also joined after the process began. The difference lies in whether a formal route followed.

Civil society. Colombia institutionalised consultation, while Afghan women's organisations appear to have relied on informal advocacy directed at the government and international actors. This plausibly constrained their capacity to shape the agenda.

Decision-making authority. The cases diverge most here. The Subcommission reviewed draft provisions and contributed to integrating a gender approach throughout the accord (Bouvier, 2016). Afghan women took part in a delegation whose mandate was set by others, after central terms had been fixed (US Department of State, 2020).

Implementation. The Colombian provisions provide a legal and normative basis for continued advocacy even though implementation lags. Afghanistan's Doha process produced no enforceable protections. Benchmarking the 13% figure against the overall implementation rate of the accord would sharpen this comparison and is a priority for future work.

Taken together, the findings are consistent with the proposition that presence becomes influence when it is institutionalised, supported by organised civil society, accompanied by decision-making authority and reinforced by enforcement mechanisms (Krause, Krause and Bränfors, 2018; Paffenholz et al., 2016). The cases differed in all four respects, which is why women's presence at the table did not lead to similar results.

5. Conclusion

5.1 Findings by objective

Forms of participation. Women took part in both processes, but in different ways. In Afghanistan they were present in local peace work, in consultative bodies and, from 2020, in a small share of the government delegation. In Colombia they entered late, as negotiators, then through the Gender Subcommission and victim delegations.

Influence across the three levels. In Afghanistan, women's influence over the national agenda, text and implementation was limited. The key decisions were made in a framework they had not shaped. In Colombia, women were associated with real influence over the agenda and text, but influence over implementation has been weaker.

Conditions. Influence was associated with the combination of institutional access, organised civil society pressure, decision-making authority and enforcement mechanisms. No single condition did the work alone. Afghanistan lacked most of them. Colombia had the first three in part and the fourth only weakly.

5.2 Policy implications

- **Mediators and parties.** The UN, the African Union, regional organisations and the states that appoint mediators should secure women's participation before agenda-setting begins, and include a gender adviser with a say in how talks are designed.

- **Formal gender mechanisms.** Parties and mediators should create bodies like the Gender Subcommission with a mandate to review draft texts before they are agreed, and with a route to raise concerns with the principals.
- **Donors and international organisations.** UN Women and donor governments should fund women's organisations over the long term and arrange regular structured meetings between them and the negotiating parties.
- **Implementation bodies.** National governments and monitoring bodies should name the institution responsible for each gender provision, give it a budget, and publish regular progress reports.

These measures depend on political will and institutional capacity.

5.3 Limitations and future research

The limitations in Section 3.4 mean the findings identify conditions associated with women's influence, not proof that they cause it. Future research could test the framework in other peace processes, benchmark gender provisions against overall implementation, and draw on interviews with negotiators and women's organisations. Women's participation should be judged not by whether they are at the table, but by whether they can shape what is decided and see it carried out.

References

- ABColombia (2018) *The participation of women in the Colombian peace process*. London: ABColombia.
- Aggestam, K. and Svensson, I. (2021) [complete details to be added].
- Al Jazeera (2020) Who are the Afghan women negotiating peace with the Taliban? 7 October.
- Anderson, M., Urlacher, B. and Swiss, L. (2026) [complete details to be added].
- Azadmanesh, A. (2020) [complete details to be added].
- Azadmanesh, A. and Ghafoori, A. (2020) [complete details to be added].
- Bouvier, V. M. (2016) *Gender and the role of women in Colombia's peace process*. New York: UN Women.
- Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3(2), pp. 77–101.
- Céspedes-Báez, L. M. and Jaramillo Ruiz, F. (2018) "Peace without women does not go!" Women's struggle for inclusion in Colombia's peace process with the FARC. *Colombia Internacional*, 94, pp. 83–109.
- Chilmeran, Y. (2022) [complete details to be added].
- Congressional Research Service (2020) *Intra-Afghan talks commence in Doha, Qatar* (CRS Insight IN11502). Washington, DC: Library of Congress.
- Council on Foreign Relations (n.d.) *Women's participation in peace processes: Afghanistan*. Available at: cfr.org (accessed [date]).
- Fal-Dutra Santos, A. (2021) *Towards gender-equal peace: from "counting women" to meaningful participation*. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
- Frogh, A. (2020) [complete details to be added].
- García, C. (2024) Gender perspective in the making: the case of the Colombian peacebuilding process. *Global Policy*, 15(S3), pp. 26–38.

- George, A. L. and Bennett, A. (2005) *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Globe and Mail (2019) [article title and date to be added].
- Government of Colombia and FARC-EP (2016) *Final agreement to end the armed conflict and build a stable and lasting peace*.
- Human Rights Watch (2021) [report title to be added].
- Joshi, M. (2025) Does the implementation status of gender provisions affect the implementation of a peace agreement? Evidence from Colombia's 2016 peace agreement implementation process. *Policy Studies Journal*, 53(4), pp. 1152–1163.
- Kamminga, J., Boswinkel, L. and Göth, T. (2020) *Because she matters: ensuring women's meaningful participation in peacebuilding in Afghanistan*. Oxfam, Cordaid and Inclusive Peace.
- Kostovicova, D. and Paskhalis, T. (2021) [complete details to be added].
- Krause, J. (2024) Power over presence: women's representation in comprehensive peace negotiations and gender provision outcomes. *American Political Science Review*, 118(2), pp. 710–728.
- Krause, J., Krause, W. and Bränfors, P. (2018) Women's participation in peace negotiations and the durability of peace. *International Interactions*, 44(6), pp. 985–1016.
- Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2022) *Time is running out to implement the gender approach in Colombia's peace accord*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame.
- Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2023) *Special report on implementation status of the gender approach within the Colombian Peace Agreement*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame.
- Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2026a) *Navigating the waters of peace: researchers address challenges, opportunities in implementation of Colombia's Peace Agreement*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame.
- Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2026b) *Nine years of implementing the Colombian Final Accord: trends and key considerations for the upcoming political transition*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame.

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Colombia (2016) *Comunicado conjunto No. 82: Enfoque de género en acuerdos de paz de La Habana*. 24 July.
- Moaid-Azm Peregrima (2023) [complete details to be added].
- Paffenholz, T. (2015) [complete details to be added].
- Paffenholz, T., Ross, N., Dixon, S., Schluchter, A.-L. and True, J. (2016) *Making women count – not just counting women: assessing women's inclusion and influence on peace negotiations*. Geneva: Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative and UN Women.
- Phelan, A. and True, J. (2022) Navigating gender in elite bargains: women's movements and the quest for inclusive peace in Colombia. *Review of International Studies*, 48(1), pp. 171–194.
- Rivas, A.-M. and Safi, M. (2022) Women and the Afghan peace and reintegration process. *International Affairs*, 98(1).
- Salvesen, H. and Nylander, D. (2017) *Towards an inclusive peace: women and the gender approach in the Colombian peace process*. Oslo: NOREF.
- UN Women (2020) *Women, peace and security: understanding the implementation of gender stipulations in peace agreements*. New York: UN Women.
- United Nations (2024) [report title to be added].
- United Nations (n.d.) [page title to be added].
- US Department of State (2020) *Agreement for bringing peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and the United States of America*. Washington, DC.
- Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and Cooperation (VIDC) (2021) *Afghan women: the quintessence for peace*. Vienna: VIDC.